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I. INTRODUCTION
Farms, ranches, and timberlands can provide a variety of valuable goods and
services. We can use agricultural land to grow crops or raise animals for food or
clothing. We also can use the land to produce timber for shelter or furniture. In
recent years, we have begun to use the land to grow crops for energy and as the
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Priorities of Environmental Law & Health.”
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site for renewable energy facilities such as wind farms. Agricultural land, however,
also can provide us with a wide range of other environmental goods and services,
often with little effort on the part of the landowner other than protecting and
maintaining natural features such as wetlands. Farms, ranches, and timberlands
can, among other things, sequester carbon (and thus help mitigate the risks of
climate change), provide recharge to underground aquifers of water, reduce
downstream flood risks, help purify water used by downstream consumers, serve
as a source of scenic beauty and inspiration, and furnish habitat for pollinators and
imperiled species. Agricultural lands, in short, can be the source of multiple,
diverse goods and services of significant value to society.
Yet farmers and other cultivators of these working landscapes have
traditionally focused on producing only a small set of these goods and services.1
Farmers have raised animals and cultivated crops, historically for food and
clothing but increasingly for energy too, while too frequently ignoring the other
goods and services that their lands can provide. This would not be surprising or
troublesome if the other goods and services were relatively valueless to society
compared to what farmers do produce, but economic and ecological studies
suggest that the unproduced or underproduced goods and services are often of
substantial value.2 Farmers are managing their lands for only some of the goods
and services that the lands can produce and consequently not optimizing the
societal value of that land.
Multiple factors explain this failure. First and foremost, society does not pay
or otherwise reward farmers to produce many of these goods and services; even
where payments are available, they often undervalue the goods and services.
Robust global markets reward farmers for growing crops and livestock, but no
one historically paid farmers to sequester carbon or provide habitat for imperiled
species. Second, farmers often have hesitated to take advantage of those markets
and incentives that exist for environmental services because of their instability and
high transaction costs. In the United States, the federal government has run a
number of programs since 1985 to support farmers who produce various
environmental services on their land ranging from habitat to water purification—
creating a federal market for the services. For example, the Wildlife Habitat
Incentives Program (WHIP) pays farmers to develop and improve wildlife habitat,
while the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) encourages the restoration of
wetlands on farmland through cost-sharing and easements.3 Funding for these
1. In the rest of this Article, I refer to the unitary “farmer.” As many of the examples
illustrate, however, the themes, proposals, and discussion of this Article address not only “farmers” in
the restricted sense of the term, but also ranchers and silviculturalists.
2. See Taylor H. Ricketts et al., Economic Value of Tropical Forests to Coffee Production, 101 PROC.
OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12579 (2004) (finding that the preservation of small remnant forests as
pollinator habitat helped significantly increase the quantity and quality of neighboring coffee
production and was more valuable than alternative uses of the land).
3. For a general discussion of current and past programs to encourage farmers to produce
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programs, however, has been unstable, because it depends on yearly congressional
appropriations that have been notoriously uncertain. Additionally, the costs of
learning about and then enrolling in each individual program are often large.4 The
uncertainty and transaction costs have scared away many farmers who might
otherwise have taken advantage of the programs. Finally, because robust markets
have not existed, there has been a dearth of organizations able and willing to
provide farmers with the technical, financial, and business expertise needed to
identify and take advantage of the market opportunities that do exist;
governmental technical assistance has also declined in recent years.5 This void has
again increased the transaction cost to farmers of identifying and participating in
market opportunities.
This does not mean that farmers never produce environmental goods and
services absent market incentives. In many cases, today’s farmers voluntarily
improve habitat on their land, protect wetlands on their property, and take other
important measures for which the market does not reward them, because of their
own personal preferences for environmental amenities.6 Such measures, however,
are not likely to reflect the full value that society places on the services. Indeed, as
discussed below, the overall environmental record of farmers is poor.
This Article examines the opportunity to transform traditional farmers into
EcoFarmers through private, philanthropic, and governmental markets. A growing
number of ecologists, economists, and legal experts have recognized an emerging
opportunity to transform agriculture by stressing the wider range of goods and
services that farmers can provide.7 This Article takes a realistic look at this

environmental goods and services, see Craig Cox, U.S. Agriculture Conservation Policy & Programs:
History, Trends, and Implications, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL 113 (Kaush
Arha et al. eds., 2006).
4. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. ZINN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MANDATORY FUNDING FOR
AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS 2 (Jan. 9, 2007) (noting importance of continual
appropriations); Kaush Arha et al., Conserving Ecosystem Services Across Agrarian Landscapes, in U.S.
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL, supra note 3, at 207, 221 (noting the problem
farmers have understanding the “vast and befuddling array of existing farm conservation programs”).
5. See Arha et al., supra note 4, at 224 (noting the need for extension help from research
institutions); Cox, supra note 3, at 134–36 (documenting and criticizing the reduction in governmental
technical support).
6. Marc Ribaudo et al., Ecosystem Services from Agriculture: Steps for Expanding Markets, 69
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2085, 2086 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Wayt Gibbs, How Should We Set Priorities?, SCI. AM., Sept. 2005, at 91; Rebecca L.
Goldman et al., Managing for Ecosystem Services on U.S. Agricultural Lands, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL
POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL, supra note 3, at 97; J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services:
Strategies for State and Local Government, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 424, 424 (2008) (urging state and local
policies to promote what he labels the “multifunctional capacity of farms”); James Salzman, A Field of
Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006); James Salzman
et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001) (calling
for the creating of markets to encourage the production of ecosystem services). In 2006, the Woods
Institute for the Environment at Stanford University held a series of workshops to develop a new
vision for federal farm policy, including prominently the production of ecosystem goods and services.
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opportunity. Unlike traditional farmers, EcoFarmers would manage their land to
maximize the overall benefit to society from the full range of goods and services
that their land can produce. Farmers would no longer be just cultivation
specialists. Instead, farmers would be multifaceted and holistic land managers,
evaluating how to preserve, improve, and utilize their land to produce that mixture
of goods and services providing the greatest societal benefit.
The transitioning of farmers to EcoFarmers has immense potential
importance to society. As ecologists and economists have emphasized,
“[a]griculture is by far the most important of the activities through which
humanity interacts with the natural world.”8 Farmers are the world’s most
significant land managers.9 Over a third of the land in the world is in agricultural
use; that fraction rises to approximately half if one excludes the least productive
lands (desert, boreal lands, rock, and ice).10 Farmland similarly constitutes almost
half of all the land in the forty-eight contiguous states in the United States.11 Thus,
failing to maximize the value of the diverse goods and services that can be
produced on farmland can have a sizable adverse impact on societal well-being.
If sufficiently profitable, EcoFarming also might help improve the economic
health of farms and rural communities—a goal that Congress has long espoused.12
EcoFarming could expand and diversify the goods and services that farms
produce, increasing income streams and reducing the market risks of specializing
in the production of one or more economically volatile crops. Farms themselves
also depend on the continued flow of supportive ecosystem services such as
pollination and climate regulation to grow crops and raise livestock,13 so efforts to
increase the flow of those services could again be beneficial to the agricultural
sector.
If successful and widespread, EcoFarming would reverse the traditional
image of farmers as not simply environmentally agnostic but environmentally
destructive. Farms in the United States are currently major sources of water

See U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL, supra note 3, at 207. In 2000, the
European Community inserted a similar vision in its Common Agricultural Policy. See Thomas L.
Dobbs & Jules N. Pretty, Agri-Environmental Stewardship Schemes and “Multifunctionality,” 26 REV. AGRIC.
ECON. 220 (2004).
8. Geoffrey M. Heal & Arthur A. Small, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 1341, 1343 (Bruce L. Gardner & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 2002).
9. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2086.
10. Virginia H. Dale & Stephen Polasky, Measures of the Effects of Agricultural Practices on Ecosystem
Services, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 286, 286 (2007).
11. Tim Kroeger & Frank Casey, An Assessment of Market-Based Approaches to Providing Ecosystem
Services on Agricultural Lands, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 321, 323 (2007).
12. An entire section of the farm bill is devoted to promoting rural development and
economic health. See, e.g., Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, Title
VI—Rural Development, §§ 6001 et seq., 122 Stat. 1651, 1923–73 (2008) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 & 42 U.S.C.).
13. Heal & Small, supra note 8, at 1348; Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 323.
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pollution, air pollution, hazardous waste, and habitat destruction.14 Farmers,
moreover, have consistently and often successfully fought efforts to bring their
operations under many of the same environmental regulations that other
businesses must meet.15 Although many environmental organizations are pushing
for new legislation and regulations that would force farmers to better manage their
lands, these efforts are likely to be only marginally successful in the near and
intermediate terms. Although agricultural lobbies are less powerful than they once
were, they are still powerful enough to kill off legislation they oppose. Most
command-and-control regulations, furthermore, require regulated industries to
meet specific standards but fail to spur new industry innovations that allow the
standards to be surpassed. EcoFarming, by contrast, would create an incentive for
innovation in the production of ecosystem services on agricultural land.
Agriculture’s poor historic environmental record is a vestige of the distorted
incentives that current agricultural markets provide. One solution is therefore to
design incentive systems that encourage farmers to consider all of the potential
goods and services that their lands can provide.
Part II of this Article reviews the concept of ecosystem services that
underlies EcoFarming and examines the attributes of services that make them
either good or poor products for EcoFarmers. Some services lend themselves to
markets or incentive programs more than other services. In particular, services
most likely to generate private markets are those that constitute private (rather
than public) goods, can be readily valued, are scarce, and cannot be readily
replaced by substitutes. Services that are public goods but meet the other criteria
are unlikely to support private markets but can still be the subject of efficient and
effective governmental incentive programs. Services that meet none of the criteria
are unlikely to support EcoFarming.
Part III investigates the various financial incentives that can drive demand
for ecosystem services and thus reward landowners for producing these services,
paying particular attention to the relative size, applicability, advantages, and
disadvantages of each type of incentive. Private commercial markets are one
source of demand, but as just mentioned, are unlikely to develop for services that
are public goods. In the case of public goods, demand is likely to come from
philanthropy (e.g., agricultural or conservation land trusts), ecolabeling (e.g., the
United States Department of Agriculture’s Organic label), direct governmental
payments (e.g., WHIP or WRP), or governmental policies that drive third-party
purchases of ecosystem services (e.g., carbon offset programs).
Part IV takes a critical look at the likely financial opportunity from specific
14. For an excellent summary of the environmental harms of current U.S. farming operations,
see J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
See also Heal & Small, supra note 8, at 1343 (detailing some of the major environmental harms from
agricultural operations).
15. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2086; Ruhl, supra note 14.
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services (e.g., energy production). The section examines the current status of
markets for key services, as well as the opportunity for future growth in each
market and, where future growth is possible, the policy steps needed both to grow
the market and to allow a budding EcoFarmer to take advantage of it. As
discussed, the most promising services from an economic perspective are the
production of renewable energy, reduction or sequestration of greenhouse gases,
provision of various hydrologic services (e.g., flood control or water quality), and
creation or restoration of habitat for biodiversity.
Part V concludes with a brief but essential consideration of two important
policy concerns regarding EcoFarming. The first is the fundamental baseline
question of what level of environmental production should be expected or
required of farmers as a matter of law rather than rewarded through private
markets or other incentive systems. While EcoFarming is likely to improve the
environmental condition of farmland, many people argue that farmers have an
obligation to do so even without payments. Is EcoFarming unethical, or even
worse, does it undermine political support for important regulatory programs?
The second concern is that the agricultural sector will capture governmental
programs supporting EcoFarming and lobby for payments even where farmers
provide no net benefit to society. As discussed in Part V, biofuels are an example
of this concern. Agricultural representatives have pushed to subsidize the broadest
set of biofuels possible, even though the environmental effects of some are
unclear and even potentially negative.
II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ECOFARMING
EcoFarming builds on the concept of ecosystem services—the recognition
that ecosystems provide humans with a range of valuable goods and services
through ecological functions and processes.16 Ecosystems can provide a wide
range of valuable goods and services ranging from food to flood protection.
Ecologists dub these collectively “ecosystem services.”17 Farms are simply a

16. For overviews of the concept of ecosystem services, see EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD.,
VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES (2009); NATURE’S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services & Natural Capital: Reconceiving Environmental Management, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460 (2008). Multiple definitions of ecosystem services exist. Thompson, supra, at
464 n.15. Among the most common are the “benefits human populations derive, directly or
indirectly, from ecosystem functions” and, more simply, the “benefits people obtain from
ecosystems.” Brendan Fisher et al., Defining and Classifying Ecosystem Services for Decision Making, 68
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 643, 645 (2009).
17. “Ecosystem service” has yet to become an everyday term. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note
16, at 468–69 (noting low use in the press). In the belief that part of the problem might be the term
itself, some scientists and policy advocates have suggested alternative terms, including “environmental
services,” “natural capital,” and “environmental amenities.” For varied name suggestions, see Robert
Lalasz, What Should We Call What Nature Provides Us?, COOL GREEN SCIENCE: THE CONSERVATION
BLOG OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Jan. 22, 2010), http://blog.nature.org/2010/01/nature
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managed ecosystem and, like natural ecosystems, can furnish a wide variety of
ecosystem goods and services of significant value to society.18 These goods and
services include food, fiber, timber, livestock, and energy, as well as water
purification, flood protection, and aesthetic beauty.
Despite the significant societal value of most ecosystem services, commercial
markets historically have rewarded landowners for producing only a small
percentage of services. For example, commercial markets have encouraged
farmers to produce food, fiber, timber, livestock, and—to a growing degree in
recent years—energy. Private markets historically have not existed for the other
services that farmland can produce. While governments sometimes have provided
monetary incentives to produce some of these services (e.g., flood protection), the
incentives often have been uncertain and limited in scope. Not surprisingly,
farmers have focused on providing those services that commercial markets or
governmental incentives encourage, to the general neglect of the other services
their lands could provide.
This Part examines what other types of ecosystem services might support
markets or incentive programs and thus help transform traditional farming into
EcoFarming. As explained below, a number of key service characteristics are likely
to be determinative. For example, services that are rival and excludable (what
economists sometimes label “private goods”) can support markets, while all other
services (public goods) typically will not generate markets absent government
intervention. Neither private markets nor governments are likely to pay for
services unless they are scarce and can be measured and at least roughly valued.
A. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Before considering such attributes, however, it is worth looking first in more
depth at what constitutes an ecosystem service and how ecosystem services have
been faring. The most comprehensive study of ecosystem services was the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, completed in 2005. With support from the
United Nations, over 1,300 scientists spent five years studying the current state of
ecosystem services around the world. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
classified ecosystem services into four categories.19 Provisioning services are the
consumptive goods that ecosystems can produce: food, fuel, fiber, genetic
resources, biochemicals, and fresh water. Regulating services are those services that
regulate the environment in which we live and make a healthful and productive
life possible. Important regulating services include climate control, flood
protection, pollination, and pest control. Cultural services are the elements of
ecosystem-services.
18. Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 323.
19. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 56–60 (2003); see also Thompson, supra note 16, at 465–66
(providing an overview of ecosystem services).
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ecosystems that contribute to people’s cultural, spiritual, and aesthetic well-being,
often by providing people with a sense of place. Finally, supporting services maintain
ecological processes that are necessary to ensure the continued supply of
provisioning, regulating, and cultural services. Important examples of these
services include soil formation, habitat, biogeochemistry, and primary
productivity.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment also examined how ecosystem
services fared during the last half of the twentieth century.20 The assessment
concluded that over sixty percent of ecosystem services declined during this
period, including such services as erosion regulation, water purification, and
pollination.21 Only four ecosystem services increased in amount: crops, livestock,
and aquaculture (all of which are readily marketable), as well as carbon
sequestration (which is somewhat more surprising given the historic lack of a
commercial market for sequestration, but reflects reforestation in significant parts
of the northern hemisphere).22
Farming during the second half of the twentieth century paralleled these
trends. Farmers excelled at increasing the amounts of food, fiber, and livestock
produced. At the same time, cropland expansion and agricultural intensification
reduced water quality, increased downstream flood risks (as farmers filled wetlands
and constructed levies and protections for their own lands), and destroyed habitat
critical for pollinators and other species. In the latter part of this period,
government regulation and a growing set of government payment systems helped
reduce the loss of these ecosystem services in the United States and other
developed nations, but the overall trend for the period was down.
B. Ecosystem Services from an EcoFarming Perspective
The four categories set out in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment have
become the most common categorization scheme for analyzing ecosystem
services, although various other schemes have been suggested.23 Unfortunately,
the categories do not help in identifying which services could be of greatest
interest to the prospective EcoFarmer or how best to structure public policy to
promote EcoFarming. The answer to these questions depends on a better
understanding of the ease or difficulty with which each service could become the
subject of a market or governmental incentive system. While the four categories
20. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS (2005).
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 7.
23. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 651–52 (calling for classification systems that are
clear, relevant to the particular ecosystem under investigation, and keyed to the decision context); Ken
J. Wallace, Classification of Ecosystem Services: Problems and Solutions, 139 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION
235, 240 (2007) (proposing a classification system that permits better assessment of the
“consequences for human well-being of manipulating ecosystems”).
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indirectly reflect some important economic considerations of relevance to farmers,
they also obscure or confuse other considerations.
As economists have observed, for example, the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment mixes and confuses final goods and services, which directly contribute
to human well-being and for which people are often willing to pay, with
intermediate processes, which are merely a step in the overall production
process.24 For example, virtually none of the supporting services (e.g.,
biogeochemistry or primary productivity) are final goods and services for which
people will pay, and they thus are unlikely to support ecosystem service markets.
The EcoFarmer may care about the services because they are essential to
producing other goods or services that will bring in revenue, but the services
typically will not provide an opportunity in themselves to expand farming
operations into new revenue streams.
Intermediate services might sometimes support a market. Where the
EcoFarmer can offer a service that is a critical intermediate process for another
economic producer, that producer might be willing to pay for the service. For
example, providing habitat for pollinators is not a final consumer good or service,
yet neighboring farmers might pay to support the habitat because of the
importance of pollinators to their crops. Where final products are difficult to
measure or attribute to the actions of any particular landowner, people or
organizations also might be willing to pay for intermediate services that they
assume will help ensure the final product that they want. Thus, governments
sometimes pay farmers to restore or protect habitat for endangered species, not
because the governments value the habitat per se (an intermediate process) but
because the habitat helps protect the species (the final product).25
In determining which ecosystem services might support EcoFarming and
how governmental policy might promote their production, three characteristics
are likely to be particularly important. The first characteristic is whether the good
or service can be readily sold in a private commercial market (assuming adequate
demand and an appropriate legal structure) or is, instead, a “public good.”26 Most
marketable goods are both “rival” (as one person consumes more of the good,
there is less for others to consume) and “excludable” (the producer or owner can
exclude others from using the good).27 Many ecosystem services, however, are

24. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD & SPENCER BANZHAF, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, WHAT ARE
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES? THE NEED FOR STANDARDIZED ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING UNITS
(2006) (criticizing the classification for mixing products, processes, and benefits); Kroeger & Casey,
supra note 11, at 322 (same); Wallace, supra note 23, at 236 (criticizing the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment classification for mixing “processes (means) for achieving services and the services
themselves (ends) within the same classification category”).
25. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing WHIP).
26. See Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 325 (concluding that the “public goods nature of
many” ecosystem services is a principal reason for the lack of markets for such services).
27. Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 647.
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neither rival nor excludable but instead “public goods.”28 For example, if a farmer
sequesters carbon on his or her land, the resulting benefit to global climate
regulation is neither rival nor excludable. Everyone in the world will enjoy the
benefit, and one person’s enjoyment of that benefit will not take away from
others’ enjoyment of the benefit. Public goods such as carbon sequestration are
unlikely to generate private commercial markets, absent government intervention,
because each beneficiary has an incentive to free ride on other beneficiaries’
investments in producing the good, rather than paying for the good himself or
herself.
To encourage farmers to produce public goods on their lands, either
governments or philanthropies will typically need to step in. As explained in Part
III, governments or philanthropies can directly pay farmers to produce such
services. Governments also can create markets for public goods through
regulatory programs. Carbon-offset programs are an example of a governmentally
created market. The government creates a market for carbon sequestration by
limiting the carbon emissions of industrial facilities but then agreeing to relax the
limitations if a facility pays someone else to sequester carbon and thus offset the
difference.
A second distinguishing characteristic among ecosystem services is
measurability: the ease of determining how a particular farm-based action is likely
to affect the quantity and monetary value of the service—and indeed whether
such a determination is possible at all. Services that are difficult to measure and
value are unlikely to lead to either markets or efficient incentive programs. Before
paying a farmer to restore a wetland as habitat for migrating waterfowl, a
conservation land trust will want to know the value of that habitat compared to
other options; the government typically will not want to provide carbon offsets
for a farmer who engages in conservation tillage to sequester carbon unless it can
determine how much carbon will be sequestered.
Unfortunately, it is currently costly and difficult, and in some cases
impossible, to (1) measure the change in the flow of specific ecosystem services as
a result of particular on-farm activities, and (2) attach a monetary value to that
change in flow.29 “Ecological production functions” that link changes in farm
management to changes in the flow of ecosystem services are missing or
rudimentary for most ecosystem services.30 Even where it is possible to calculate
flow changes, such calculations often require careful and expensive investigations
28. See, e.g., Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2086 (observing that “nearly” all ecosystem services
are public goods).
29. See EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 16, at 22–23 (noting that both biophysical
measurement and monetary valuation are needed); Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 325, 328
(same); Heal & Small, supra note 8, at 1366 (observing that variables must be measurable “at low cost,
and without undue risk of tampering or fraud”).
30. See Dale & Polasky, supra note 10, at 287 (discussing the problem of measuring changes in
the flow of services as a result of management efforts); Thompson, supra note 16, at 471–72 (same).
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of local parameters, because ecosystems and ecosystem services are highly
heterogeneous.31 For example, restoration of one wetland might significantly
increase recreational value, but not restoration of another. Where commercial
markets do not exist for particular goods or services, calculating an accurate
market value for a change in the service flow also can be difficult, assuming that it
is possible at all, because reliable commercial data for establishing a price is
lacking.32 Values for many services are again highly localized, adding to the
expense of determining an appropriate price.33 The value of recreational
opportunities, for example, might differ significantly between Northern California
and North Dakota.
Determining the flow and market value of an ecosystem service is likely to
grow easier over time. Both scientists and economists are working to find simpler
and more accurate methods for determining the monetary values of ecosystem
services produced by land-use management. Just as market demand helped to
drive the monetization techniques and institutions that underlie today’s market
economy in commodified goods and services,34 increased interest in ecosystem
services is helping to drive improved techniques for measuring the value of these
services as well. A cottage industry of researchers is currently working to develop
new model-based systems for measuring the flow of ecosystem services from
farms and other lands.35 An example is the Natural Capital Project, which has
developed a tool known as InVEST to model and map the delivery, distribution,
and economic value of a suite of ecosystem services.36 Nonetheless, even with
significant measurement advances, some ecosystem services will remain more
difficult to measure monetarily than others. For example, changes in hydrologic
services such as the provision or purification of freshwater tend to be very site
specific and therefore more difficult to predict or measure than changes in other
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration. Ecosystem services that
consumers do not physically use, which includes virtually all cultural services, also
tend to be more difficult to value monetarily.
Where accurate and precise valuation is impossible or more expensive to
determine than a service is worth, private markets are very unlikely to arise.37 Few
31. See EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 16, at 33 (noting the problem of having to
parameterize models to local conditions); Heal & Small, supra note 8, at 1366 (commenting on the
heterogeneity of agriculture and the services that it can provide); Thompson, supra note 16, at 472
(noting the difficult task of parameterization).
32. See Thompson, supra note 16, at 472 (noting that economists use a variety of techniques
for placing values on ecosystem services, some of which are more difficult to apply than others).
33. See Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 324.
34. See Dale & Polasky, supra note 10, at 287.
35. See Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 328.
36. See PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NATURAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAPPING
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2011); Natural Capital Project—InVEST: Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem
Services and Tradeoffs, http://www.naturalcapitalproject.org/invest.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
37. See Kroeger & Casey, supra note 11, at 328.

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

1178

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

[Vol. 1:1167

private entities are likely to pay for a service if the value of that service is
uncertain. Governments may still be willing to create incentive programs if they
believe they have a sufficient sense of the value of the service, no matter how
rough; governmental incentive programs generally do not demand high levels of
accuracy. But even governmental incentive programs demand some ability to
determine the value of the activity being encouraged. Measurement inaccuracies,
moreover, make it more likely that government incentives will not accurately
reflect the true value of the ecosystem service and thus either understimulate or
overstimulate production of that service.
The final important difference among ecosystem services is the relative
scarcity of and demand for each service. Viable markets for ecosystem services
will arise only when the services become sufficiently scarce. Historically, the
natural flow of many ecosystem goods and services was sufficiently ample that no
one needed to pay landowners to support or produce them.38 Even where
ecosystem goods and services are scarce, their value will depend on the availability
of substitutes. If substitutes are less expensive than the cost of maintaining and
producing the services, no market will develop for the service. For example,
pollination might be a valuable service, but farmers will not pay neighboring
landowners to protect the habitat of pollinators if they judge that there are already
sufficient pollinators in the area (i.e., the service is not in scarce supply) or if it is
less expensive to hire a beekeeper to provide the service (i.e., a good substitute is
available). The government is also unlikely to provide financial incentives in such
situations.

38.

See id. at 325.
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Table 1
Ecosystem Goods & Services of Potential Interest to EcoFarming

Food

No

Ease of
Valuing the
Service
High

Fiber

No

High

High

Livestock

No

High

High

Timber

No

High

High

Energy

No

High

High

Carbon
Sequestration

Yes

Medium

High

Water
Purification

Yes

Low

Can be
regionally high

Water Supply

No

Low

Can be
regionally high

Flood Protection

Yes

High

Can be
regionally high

Wildlife Habitat

Yes

Low

Can be
regionally high

Erosion
Protection

Yes

Medium

Can be
regionally high

Pollination

Yes

Medium

Can be
regionally
moderate

Recreation
(including
hunting &
fishing)

No

Medium

Generally low

Aesthetics

Yes

Low

Can be
regionally
moderate

Service

Is the Service a
Public Good?

Likely Scarcity
Value of the
Service
High

Table 1 lists the major ecosystem goods and services for which a prospective
EcoFarmer might receive compensation either through private compensation or
governmental incentive programs, along with their defining characteristics. The
table lists the goods and services in the approximate order of their likely income
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value to the EcoFarmer. By evaluating each service for the characteristics
described above, Table 1 also provides a rough sense of the likelihood that
effective markets or other incentives will develop for each service. These
characteristics help determine (1) whether a private market is possible in the
service, and (2) how difficult it is likely to be to create any type of efficient
incentive program, whether governmental or philanthropic. As discussed above,
public goods are unlikely to support private markets absent the creation of new
forms of exclusionary property rights in the service. Public goods will generally
require governmental or philanthropic incentives to enable production by the
EcoFarmer. Difficulty in measuring the flow or value of an ecosystem service will
make it difficult to develop markets or optimal incentive programs, although
governments or philanthropies may create an incentive program in any case. Not
knowing the full value of carbon sequestration on farmland does not preclude the
government from establishing a market that provides for some level of
sequestration, but government incentives are less likely and, if they exist, less likely
to be efficient. Finally, where scarcity is low or substitutes are inexpensive, neither
markets nor incentive programs are likely to arise—nor would they benefit overall
societal well-being.
III. MARKETS AND OTHER INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
In examining the prospects for EcoFarming and determining policies needed
to support the transformation, it is also important to consider how farmers might
be rewarded for producing a broader range of valuable goods and services. Purely
private commercial markets will provide incentives for an important but limited
segment of environmental services—increased energy production, and perhaps in
some regions the provision of freshwater. Philanthropic organizations, such as
The Nature Conservancy, may also support the production of some services, such
as habitat preservation and management, where it aligns with the organization’s
mission, but that support is likely to be marginal and socially inadequate.
Consumer demand for environmentally sustainable products may also encourage
farmers, as a sidelight of their cultivation of crops and raising of livestock, to
preserve and promote ecosystem services that are salient to the public and
rewarded by certification or market programs. Government will have to develop
markets for most of the new ecosystem services producible on farmland by
creating mitigation markets, mandating purchases of the services, directly paying
farmers to produce the services, or using tax policy to encourage private
investments in the production of ecosystem services. Table 2 lists the potential
categories of support for EcoFarming, along with examples of markets or
programs in each category.
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Table 2
Potential Sources of Demand for Agricultural
Production of Ecosystem Services
Source of Demand for
Ecosystem Services
Private Commercial Markets

Examples



Markets for biofuels and other
renewable energy
Markets for hunting and fishing
privileges on private land

Environmental Philanthropy




Agricultural easements
Conservation easements

Ecolabels



USDA Organic

Governmental Payments




Conservation Security Program
Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP)
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program
(WHIP)
Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)
National and state subsidies for
biofuels
Tax deductions for contributions of
conservation or agricultural
easements
Tax deductions for monetary
contributions to land trusts or
agricultural trusts




Tax Leverage




Governmental Mandates




Governmental Mitigation or
“Offset” Programs






Surface Water Treatment Rule
under the U.S. Safe Drinking Water
Act
State Renewable Portfolio
Standards
Wetlands mitigation and banking
under the U.S. Clean Water Act
§ 404
Water quality trading under the U.S.
Clean Water Act
Habitat Conservation Plans under
the U.S. Endangered Species Act
Agricultural offset programs under
carbon cap-and-trade program
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A. Private Commercial Markets
Many scientists and policy makers have hoped that increased understanding
of ecosystem services would produce private commercial markets in which
beneficiaries of services would voluntarily pay landowners to produce the services
out of enlightened self-interest.39 For example, cities might pay upstream
landowners to protect and construct wetlands for water quality and flood
protection; farmers might pay neighboring landowners to maintain habitat for
pollinators; bird watchers might pay property owners to provide habitat for
migrating bird species and for permission to come onto their land to see the birds.
To help promote this vision of private ecosystem-service markets, the 2008
United States Farm Bill instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to “facilitate the
participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging
environmental services markets” and created an Office of Environmental Markets
in the Department of Agriculture; the Washington State government similarly
passed a bill providing for a study of how ecosystem-service markets might
promote increased conservation practices on agricultural land.40
Private markets are likely to play an important role in supporting
EcoFarming. An increasing number of farmers are taking advantage of markets
for biofuels, wind production, and other renewable energy to increase and
diversify their incomes.41 Cities and large water users have occasionally paid
farmers and other landowners to produce hydrologic services of importance to the
cities and water users (e.g., protection of water quality and reduction of
downstream flood risks). Perrier-Vittel, for example, paid French farmers to
manage their farmlands to protect water quality; Macquarie River Food & Fibre
has paid Australian farmers to reforest their lands to mitigate salinity concerns;
Napa Valley in California has paid land owners to restore wetlands to reduce flood
risks; Quito, Ecuador has paid upstream farmers to protect the city’s water supply
by improving land management; and hydropower companies have paid upstream
landowners to reduce sediment loadings.42
Private markets, however, also will play an inherently limited role. Significant
commercial markets for potential EcoFarm products remain limited to those

39. Thompson, supra note 16, at 474–75.
40. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 § 2709; Farm and Forest Land Preservation
and Restoration Act, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 687; USDA Office of Environmental Markets, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/oem/index.shtml/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 19,
2010).
41. See, e.g., Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2085 (noting that markets for energy are well
established).
RODNEY J. KEENAN, CTR. FOR APPLIED ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF NEW SOUTH
42.
WALES, APPROACHES TO PROVIDING FOR MULTIPLE VALUES AND FUNCTIONS FROM FORESTS IN
AUSTRALIA (2005); Are You Being Served?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2005, at 91; Kroeger & Casey, supra
note 11, at 325 n.4; Sandra L. Postel & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Watershed Protection: Capturing the
Benefits of Nature’s Water Supply Services, 29 NAT. RES. F. 98, 101–05 (2005).
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products for which private commercial markets have long existed: food, fiber,
timber, livestock, and energy. Private water transactions have been local and
isolated. None of the water transactions listed in the previous paragraph occurred
as part of established commodity markets, which do not exist for water quality or
flood protection. Instead, all of the transactions were local one-off agreements, in
which interested parties negotiated specific terms responsive to local concerns and
conditions. Such one-off agreements generally involve high transaction costs that
limit their duplication elsewhere.
Governmental policies, moreover, have often driven the energy markets and
water transactions that have arisen to date. As discussed later, governmental
subsidies and renewable portfolio standards have undergirded and promoted the
markets for renewable energy, including biofuels. Governmental policies also have
encouraged United States cities to pay farmers near the sources of their water
supplies to manage their lands to improve water quality. Many articles and books
have pointed to New York City’s efforts to protect two of its watersheds (the
Delaware and Catskills) as an example of the type of voluntary market that could
arise for hydrologic services.43 Rather than pay six billion dollars in capital costs to
filter its water supply, New York City instead invested one-and-a-half billion
dollars to restore and protect its watershed, including paying farmers to improve
their land management.44 Yet New York City did not act voluntarily. The national
Safe Drinking Water Act and EPA’s “Surface Water Treatment Rule” required the
city to choose between protecting its watershed and filtering its water.45
Confronted by this choice, New York City naturally chose the least expensive
option. Although some other major cities subject to the EPA rule have followed
suit and protected their watersheds, very few cities in the United States are subject
to the Surface Water Treatment Rule because they already filter their water, and
few cities have voluntarily chosen to pay for upstream water quality services
absent any governmental mandate.46
Given the obstacles to private ecosystem-service markets discussed in Part
II, the existence of any voluntary markets for ecosystem services other than for
crops, livestock, and energy is more surprising than their relative dearth. As Table
1 shows, crops, livestock, and energy are the only ecosystem goods or services that
meet the three principal requirements for robust markets—private goods, readily
measurable value, and scarcity. As discussed earlier, most other ecosystem
services, including water quality and flood control, are public goods. In some
cases, dominant users of a particular service (e.g., the only major city in a

43. See, e.g., GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF
NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 61–86 (2002).
44. Postel & Thompson, supra note 42, at 104–05.
45. Thompson, supra note 16, at 480.
46. See id. at 477 (describing two separate studies of water suppliers in the western United
States).
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watershed with deteriorating water quality) might be willing to invest in protecting
and promoting that service because they will receive virtually all the benefit of
their investment (so free riding on others is not an option, and free riding by
others is less of a concern). Even in these cases, however, the difficulty of
estimating the value of the service may prove an insurmountable obstacle.47
The lack of voluntary private markets for many important ecosystem services
does not mean that EcoFarming is financially unsupportable. The difficulty of
establishing voluntary markets instead highlights the importance of governmental
policies in creating markets (as in the case of EPA’s Surface Water Treatment
Rule) or providing substitute incentives. Many noncommercial services are
sufficiently valuable in specific regions that, if the government can help drive and
support markets, those markets could be a valuable source of EcoFarming
income. As in so many areas involving public goods, governmental support can be
both useful and essential.
B. Philanthropic Payments
Two sets of philanthropic groups could provide a significant source of
funding to the EcoFarmer. The first is agricultural land trusts. Beginning with the
formation of the Marin Agricultural Land Trust in 1980, a growing number of
agricultural land trusts across the nation have acquired agricultural easements on
millions of acres of farmland and ranchland.48 These easements provide farmers
with funding that is sometimes critical to remaining in business, in return for
which the farmer agrees not to develop the land for nonagricultural purposes.
Currently, at least fifteen states both authorize agricultural easements and support
such programs through bond funding, tax policy, or other mechanisms.49
The value of existing agricultural easements in promoting ecosystem goods
and services, however, is open to question. To date, the typical agricultural
easement requires only that the land remain in agricultural operation; most do not
require or encourage farmers to provide ecosystem services beyond traditional
crops and livestock. Moreover, in choosing which lands to protect, agricultural
land trusts have looked primarily at the quality of the land for traditional
47. Postel & Thompson, supra note 42, at 106–07 (describing the problems that the City of
Santa Cruz had in placing an economic value on watershed protection); Thompson, supra note 16, at
477–78 (noting that water suppliers in California often cannot determine the value of investments in
watershed protection).
48. See A NATIONAL VIEW OF AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT PROGRAMS: PROFILES AND
MAPS—REPORT 1, at 8 (Alvin D. Sokolow & Anita Zurbrugg eds., 2003) [hereinafter
AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT REPORT 1] (estimating that agricultural land trusts had preserved
approximately 1.8 million acres as of the date of the study). For information regarding the Marin
Agricultural Land Trust, see MARIN AGRIC. LAND TRUST, http://www.malt.org/ (last visited Sept.
26, 2010); see also A National View of Agricultural Easement Programs, AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST,
http://www.farmland.org/resources/national-view/default.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (providing
general information on agricultural easements).
49. AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT REPORT 1, supra note 48, at 8, 17–18.
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agricultural productivity (e.g., soil quality); only a few have looked at the
conservation or environmental value of the land—and then only as secondary
factors.50 For this reason, studies of agricultural-easement programs find that the
programs have been very successful in keeping land in farming and redirecting
urban growth, but have not reported any gains in ecosystem-service production.51
At least a few agricultural preservation groups, such as the American Farmland
Trust, are growing increasingly interested in the opportunity for EcoFarming,52
but it is not clear whether that interest will translate into broader goals and
mandates for agricultural easements.
A second set of more traditional conservation land trusts, such as The
Nature Conservancy, Trust for Public Lands, Ducks Unlimited, and the Rocky
Mountain Elk Foundation, have long used private and public funding to acquire
conservation easements and fee interests to preserve natural landscapes and the
ecosystem services that they provide.53 Recognizing the limits of a conservation
strategy focused exclusively on natural landscapes, such groups are increasingly
paying farmers and other landowners to improve the conservation value of
working landscapes.54 Some conservation groups have even helped create and
support for-profit companies that look for ways of raising cash crops, such as
timber, while promoting environmental services such as biodiversity habitat. For
example, Conservation Forestry, which works frequently with The Nature
Conservancy, raises investment funds to engage in sustainable forestry practices
while ensuring an attractive rate of return for its investors.55
50. Id. at 19. According to a study of agricultural easements by the American Farmland Trust
and University of California, the principal factors used in selecting easements in most programs were
the agricultural quality of the land, followed by contiguity of the acreage to previously conserved land;
other programs focused more on location or geography. A NATIONAL VIEW OF AGRICULTURAL
EASEMENT PROGRAMS: HOW PROGRAMS SELECT FARMLAND TO FUND—REPORT 2, at 3 (Anita
Zurbrugg & Alvin D. Sokolow eds., 2006).
51. See, e.g., ALVIN D. SOKOLOW, A NATIONAL VIEW OF AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT
PROGRAMS: MEASURING SUCCESS IN PROTECTING FARMLAND—REPORT 4, at 3 (2006) (reporting
on the successes of agricultural easements).
52. See, e.g., American Farmland Trust, Agriculture & Environment: Improving the Environment by
Protecting Clean Air and Clean Water, AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, http://www.farmland.org
/programs/environment/default.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (discussing programs to promote
environmental services on farmland).
53. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 245, 254–55 (2002-2003) [hereinafter Thompson, Conservation Options] (describing
philanthropic conservation); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Providing Biodiversity Through Policy Diversity, 38
IDAHO L. REV. 355, 373 (2001-2002) [hereinafter Thompson, Policy Diversity] (same).
54. See Adina R. Rissman et al., Conservation Easements: Biodiversity Protection and Private Use, 21
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 709 (2007) (noting that nearly half of the easements sampled in the
authors’ study were for working landscapes involving farming, ranching, or forestry).
55. See, e.g., Press Release, The Nature Conservancy, Conservation Deal Promotes Sustainable
Forestry, Recreation, and Private Ownership (April 9, 2009), available at http://www.nature.org/our
initiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/pennsylvania/newsroom/conservation-deal-promotes
-sustainable-forestry-recreation-and-private.xml (describing joint project of The Nature Conservancy
and Conservation Forestry to provide for sustainable timber operations in Pennsylvania).
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Even if conservation groups and agricultural land trusts increasingly support
EcoFarming, however, such philanthropic support will inherently be of only
marginal importance to the vast majority of farmers. Philanthropy depends on the
selfless donations of private citizens, the beneficence of corporations hoping for
good publicity, and governmental support. Private contributions will inherently
fail to reflect the full value of the resulting ecosystem services to the donors, for at
least two reasons. First, many citizens are simply unaware of the ecosystem
services that benefit them; second, those that are aware will be tempted to free
ride on others’ contributions.56 Business support will reflect the marketing value
of the contributions, rather than the actual value of ecosystem services to society,
and historically such contributions have constituted only a small fraction of the
support received by land trusts in the United States.57 Governmental support for
land trusts has become increasingly important in recent years, but must deal with
the same limitations in public budgets as other programs currently do.
Even if available funding were greater, the structure of philanthropy is not
well suited to promoting EcoFarming. Successful EcoFarming requires continued
innovation in maximizing socially valuable ecosystem services on farmland.
However, the traditional tool of land trusts—the conservation easement—is better
at preventing unwanted behavior such as development than at encouraging
dynamic production of ecosystem services. Conservation easements historically
have provided farmers with a single upfront payment, leading to a principal-agent
problem in which the landowner has an incentive to cheat and the easement
holder must engage in constant monitoring.58 Although land trusts could switch to
periodic contractual payments to encourage the continual provision of ecosystem
services, farmers are unlikely to invest in the production of new ecosystem
services unless they are assured a continued stream of payments over a sufficient
length of time to amortize the necessary investments. Because of their heavy
reliance on yearly donations and other funding, land trusts may not be able to
generate the degree of funding reliability that the EcoFarmer will demand.
C. Consumer Demand for EcoFarming
In recent years, a number of efforts at ecolabeling have tried to use
consumer preference for environmental sustainability to encourage more
sustainable business practices.59 The Marine Stewardship Council, for example,
56. Thompson, Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 255.
57. For example, in 2010, corporations provided only seven percent of the donations to The
Nature Conservancy; by contrast, individuals and foundations provided thirty-four and thirty-three
percent, respectively. See NATURE CONSERVANCY, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2011), available at
www.nature.org/media/annualreport/annualreport2010.pdf.
58. Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or
Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 498–99, 503–04 (2004).
59. Jay S. Golden et al., Sustainable Product Indexing: Navigating the Challenge of Ecolabeling, 15(3)
ECOLOGY & SOC. 8 (2010); A. Banerjee & B.D. Solomon, Eco-Labeling for Energy Efficiency and
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certifies seafood that has been caught sustainably; the Forestry Stewardship
Council warrants the sustainable production of wood products; EPA’s Energy Star
program highlights electronic products that minimize energy use.60 Consumers
repeatedly report that they would prefer to purchase products that have been
produced in an environmentally sustainable fashion, although the actual impact of
ecolabeling on consumer and business behavior is still not clear.61 Ecolabeling of
agricultural products could provide a mechanism for encouraging farmers to
produce a broader and more balanced array of ecosystem services. An “EcoFarm”
label could reward the joint production of traditional food crops with other
ecosystem services.
One of the best known ecolabels in the United States today is the “USDA
Organic Seal,” which is a national label controlled by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.62 Because organic farming promotes the production of several
important ecosystem services such as wildlife protection and improved water
quality, the USDA Organic label could serve as a precursor for a broader
EcoFarm label. However, despite gains in organic farming, only a very small
percentage of agricultural land in the United States—half a percent in 2005—is
certified organic.63 Without evidence that consumers would pay significantly more
for a broader EcoFarm label, ecolabeling is unlikely to encourage farmers to invest
the additional sums needed to be true EcoFarmers.64
D. Governmental Support
Given the inherent limitations of voluntary markets, philanthropy, and
ecolabels in promoting EcoFarming, governmental support will be essential in
creating adequate economic incentives. This is not surprising. Nor does it mean
that EcoFarming is economically inefficient, producing less in economic benefits
to society than it costs. As discussed in Part II, most ecosystem goods and services
are public goods for which purely private markets will not work. And both
philanthropy and labeling, as just described, generally fail to generate financial
support equivalent to the social gains.
Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of U.S. Programs, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 109 (2003).
60. Golden et al., supra note 59, at 8–9.
61. Id. at 8 (reporting that ninety-five percent of surveyed U.S. consumers report that they
would buy “green”); Katharina Sammer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, The Influence of Eco-Labeling on Consumer
Behaviour: Results of a Discrete Choice Analysis for Washing Machines, 15 BUS. STRATEGY & ENVT. 185
(2006) (reporting on the results of a study of Swiss consumers).
62. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING DIVISION, NATIONAL ORGANIC
PROGRAM, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004446 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2010) (describing the USDA organic label).
63. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087.
64. The development of an effective ecolabel, moreover, can be complex and create perverse,
unintended consequences if not carefully executed. See Golden et al., supra note 59, at 9–12
(describing the problems, including loss of biodiversity, created through the promotion of “shade
coffee”).
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Government support can take multiple forms. As discussed below, the
principal forms of support include direct payments, the use of tax deductions or
credits to leverage philanthropic support for ecosystem services, and regulatory
policies that create and stimulate markets for ecosystem services. The choice
among these alternative governmental policies depends primarily on the political
decision of who should ultimately pay for ecosystem goods and services. General
taxpayers, for example, ultimately pay for direct support; most governmental
policies that create markets place the burden on the shoulders of a regulated
community; under tax deductions, taxpayers, and philanthropists share the cost.
Different policies also can have differential appeal to farmers. For example,
farmers may prefer to work with private groups rather than the government, in
which case tax leverage of private donations to conservation groups may be
preferable to direct government payments.65
1.

Direct Governmental Payments

Beginning with the 1985 Farm Bill, the United States has created a number
of programs to compensate farmers for various actions that produce ecosystem
services of value to society.66 Early programs emphasized taking land out of
production and managing the land instead for environmental benefits.67 The
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), established under the 1985 Farm Bill,
reduces sediment discharge into streams by providing farmers with an annual
rental payment if, under ten-to-fifteen-year contracts with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, they take sensitive land out of production and establish permanent
vegetative cover on the land.68 Another program established under the 1985 bill,
the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP), pays farmers to restore and protect
wetlands on their property either for thirty years or in perpetuity.69
While CRP and WRP focus on changing long-term land use, programs
created under the 2002 Farm Bill encourage farmers to improve and actively

65. See Thompson, Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 306 (noting that private property
owners often feel more comfortable working with nongovernmental organizations than with
government).
66. See Arha et al., supra note 4, at 209–18 (summarizing major conservation programs of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture); Thompson, Policy Diversity, supra note 53, at 366–67; Thompson,
Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 271–72. “The 1985 Farm Bill accelerated the introduction of
environmental concerns into agricultural policy and marked the beginning of what has become the
most important development in agricultural conservation policy and programs since the New Deal—
the transition from a focus on productivity-enhancing, agricultural-resource conservation with large
‘on-farm’ benefits to environmental management and improvement with large ‘off-farm’ benefits.”
Cox, supra note 3, at 115.
67. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 208.
68. Id. at 213; Cox, supra note 3, at 117, 143; Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation:
Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 593,
629–30 (2010).
69. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 213; Cox, supra note 3, at 145; Angelo, supra note 68, at 630.
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manage their lands to promote environmental benefits.70 The Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), for example, provides financial and technical
assistance to farmers who wish to implement conservation practices on their land
to enhance soil conditions, water quality, wetlands, and wildlife habitat, although
the payments only offset costs and thus do not constitute an affirmative
incentive.71 The Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) similarly offers
financial cost-sharing and technical assistance, but no affirmative incentives, to
farmers wishing to promote wildlife habitat on their land.72 The Conservation
Security Program (CSP) goes a step further than these first two programs and pays
farmers for ongoing stewardship of soil conservation and water quality.73
The federal farm bill is not the only source of direct governmental payments
for ecosystem services. Both the federal and state governments directly subsidize
the production of some ecosystem services. For example, the federal government
offers a number of subsidies to encourage the production of biofuels on
agricultural land.74 States often subsidize farm-based production of other forms of
renewable energy, such as wind production or biomethane.75
The United States also is not alone in paying farmers to produce ecosystem
services. Australia, for example, has experimented with a “bush tender” program
that rewards farmers for producing a broad array of ecosystem services on their
land—in contrast to United States programs that often focus on single services.76
Europe also pays farmers for the production of ecosystem services on their land.77

70. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 208–09. The 2002 Farm Bill also marked a milestone in
explicitly recognizing that the purposes of the new agricultural assistance programs were
environmental. Cox, supra note 3, at 119.
71. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 213; Cox, supra note 3, at 119, 122, 142; Angelo, supra note 68,
at 630–32.
72. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 213; Cox, supra note 3, at 122; Angelo, supra note 68, at 631–32.
73. Arha et al., supra note 4, at 213; Cox, supra note 3, at 122, 144. Other important federal
programs that promote environmental management of agricultural land include the Agricultural Water
Enhancement Program (which pays farmers to conserve water and improve water quality), the
Conservation Stewardship Program (which pays for the adoption and maintenance of conservation
activities), and the Agricultural Management Assistance Program (which provides both cost sharing
and affirmative payments for farming measures that promote water management, water quality, and
erosion control). See Angelo, supra note 68, at 631–32 (describing these and other programs).
74. See, e.g., PAUL FRISMAN, CONN. OFFICE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, BIODIESEL PRODUCTION
SUBSIDIES (2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0904.htm.
75. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE TEXAS COMPTROLLER, GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES,
WINDOW ON STATE GOVERNMENT (2008), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt
/energy/subsidies/ (discussing Texas subsidies).
76. For information on Australia’s bush tender program, see Bush Tender 2007, QUEENSLAND
MURRAY-DARLING COMMITTEE, http://www.qmdc.org.au/projects/bush-tender-2007.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2010).
77. See, e.g., Michael Hammell, Environmental Integration into Agricultural Policy in the European
Union, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL, supra note 3, at 147 (describing
agricultural programs in the European Union).
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Leveraging Private Payments Through Tax Policy

Governments also use tax policy to both directly subsidize the production of
ecosystem services and drive philanthropic markets for ecosystem services. As
described earlier, agricultural and conservation land trusts encourage the
production of ecosystem services through the acquisition of easements that
prohibit development and, in some cases, require particular land-use practices. In
some cases, the government effectively subsidizes the acquisition of such
easements by giving tax deductions to farmers who donate easements to land
trusts.78
In other cases, however, governmental support leverages private funding of
conservation easements and other land-use practices designed to protect and
promote ecosystems. As noted earlier, the private funding that land trusts receive
to buy easements and encourage land uses that promote ecosystem services is less
than the easements’ or actions’ social value because of free-rider problems.
Governments use their tax policies to help encourage larger private gifts to land
trusts by giving tax deductions for such gifts.79 In this situation, the government is
not directly paying for the easements or land-use practices, but instead using its
funds to encourage private individuals to increase their investments or gifts.
Studies suggest that tax deductions are likely to increase gifts by more than the lost
tax revenue, allowing governments to leverage the use of their limited financial
resources to protect or promote ecosystem services.80
3.

Governmentally Driven Markets

Governmental policies also can create markets for ecosystem services.81 As
discussed earlier, the national Safe Drinking Water Act, combined with EPA’s
Surface Water Treatment Rule, have driven the investments of New York City and
other municipalities in protecting their watersheds. Climate policies, either existing
or anticipated, are driving some utilities and other companies to invest in carbon
sequestration on agricultural lands.
Two types of governmental policies can create ecosystem service markets.
First, the government can mandate that particular entities invest in ecosystem
services. EPA’s Surface Water Treatment Rule, discussed earlier, is an example.
Under that rule, EPA requires water suppliers that are not filtering water to invest
in protecting their watersheds so that land in the watershed continues to produce

78. See Thompson, Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 274; Thompson, Policy Diversity, supra
note 53, at 373–74.
79. See Thompson, Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 273–74; Thompson, Policy Diversity,
supra note 53, at 373–74.
80. See Thompson, Conservation Options, supra note 53, at 274–75 (citing studies); Thompson,
Policy Diversity, supra note 53, at 376.
81. See Thompson, supra note 16, at 479–85 (discussing the important role that government
and law play in creating and promoting markets for ecosystem services).
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high quality drinking water.82 State renewable-energy portfolio standards, which
require electricity suppliers in a state to supply a set percentage of their power
through renewable-energy sources, is another example of a governmental mandate
driving a significant market for an environmental service.83 Without renewable
portfolio standards, the market for siting wind power and other sources of
renewable energy on agricultural lands would be substantially smaller.
Governments also create markets for ecosystem services through mitigation
or offset policies, in which regulated entities are permitted to engage in activities
harmful to the environment in return for the entities’ investment in other activities
that offset the harm in full or part. Greenhouse gas offset programs are a
prominent example. Under proposed global policies for “Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD), nations or companies
obligated to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a set amount could partially
meet their obligation by paying to protect forests that sequester carbon.84 The
principal climate bills that Congress considered in 2009 and 2010 would have
permitted regulated entities to partially meet their carbon-reduction requirements
by paying farmers to sequester carbon through no-till farming and similar
actions.85
Several existing mitigation programs already drive markets for the
production of ecosystem services on agricultural lands. For example, wetland
mitigation measures under section 404 of the Clean Water Act permit landowners,
in limited situations, to modify wetlands on their own property in return for
restoring or constructing wetland elsewhere.86 Emerging water quality trading
under the Clean Water Act allows some “point” sources of pollution such as
factories to relax their emission discharge limitations by paying “non-point”
sources to reduce their emissions instead.87 Finally, the Endangered Species Act
permits landowners to modify the habitat of endangered species, which otherwise
would violate the Act’s “taking” proscriptions, in return for individual or regional
habitat conservation plans (HCPs) that take other actions to protect the species;
these actions frequently include protection and enhancement of other habitat,
including agricultural lands.88 Endangered species laws also have generated local
82.
83.

40 C.F.R. § 141.70-75 (2010).
See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 311–12 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the renewable portfolio standards existing in thirty of the
fifty states).
84. See id. at 134 (providing a brief overview of REDD); MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD:
ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS (Arild Angelsen ed., 2008).
85. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 170–71.
86. Id. at 278. See also J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental
Law: A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 365–66 (2001) (providing
an overview of wetland banking programs).
87. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 170–71.
88. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 101 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2005).
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markets for habitat through so-called “conservation banks.”89
IV. ECOFARMING OPPORTUNITIES
EcoFarming in theory could involve the production of any ecosystem good
or service. In practice, a small number of ecosystem goods and services are likely
to provide the greatest financial opportunity and thus attract the most attention
from EcoFarmers. These include (in addition to traditional crops and livestock)
energy production, carbon sequestration, various hydrological services (with the
greatest opportunity probably coming from water quality and flood protection),
and biodiversity habitat. This Part examines the opportunities that each of these
services or goods is likely to offer in the near future, as well as obstacles to
developing effective markets for these services and goods, and potential policy
steps to address them.
EcoFarmers will also manage their lands for other services or goods. Many
farmers in the United States, for example, have long opened their lands to
commercial hunting, fishing, camping, or other forms of recreation, and a small
percentage charge a fee for such use.90 In many cases, paid recreational use has
enabled farmers to remain in business despite downturns in crop or livestock
prices.91 Hunting, fishing, and other forms of direct recreational use meet the
criteria for private goods (rival and excludable) and are thus well-suited to market
payments. States, moreover, have sometimes supplemented private recreational
revenue by paying farmers for public access rights across their lands for hunting,
fishing, or other purposes.92 Payments for recreational use of agricultural land,
however, are likely to remain small compared to the revenue that farmers might
earn from the ecosystem services or goods discussed in the remainder of this
section.93

89. Jessica Fox et al., Conservation Banking, in 2 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY:
CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY IN HUMAN-DOMINATED LANDSCAPES 228 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael
Scott & Frank W. Davis eds., 2006) (providing an overview of conservation banking programs).
90. See JOHN D. COPELAND, RECREATIONAL ACCESS TO PRIVATE LANDS: LIABILITY
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1998), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org
/assets/articles/copeland_recreationalaccess.pdf; Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087 (citing a 1993
study finding that seventy-seven percent of farmers permit hunting but only five percent charge for
the opportunity, and citing a 2007 study finding that only one to two percent of farmers receive
income from recreational activity).
91. COPELAND, supra note 90, at 10.
92. See, e.g., Doug Huddle, Outdoors: Record Revenue Leads to More Hunting Access, BELLINGHAM
HERALD, Aug. 12, 2010 (describing Washington State program to dedicate $400,000 toward access
agreements between the state and private landowners for hunting).
93. See, e.g., W. Aaron Jenkins et al., Valuing Ecosystem Services from Wetlands Restoration in the
Mississippi Alluvial Valley, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1051, 1057 (2010) (concluding that, of a potential
total of $1035 per hectare that farmers in the Mississippi alluvial valley could raise from the ecosystem
services created by restored wetlands, only fifteen dollars would come from recreational fees).
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A. Renewable Energy
Renewable energy presents a substantial opportunity for agriculture. Like
crops and livestock, energy is a private (rather than public) good and can be
readily valued in the marketplace (see Table 1). Indeed, biofuels are merely a crop
grown for energy rather than for food or fiber. Renewable energy also promises
sizable revenue in the long run, although most forms of renewable energy are not
currently cost competitive and thus require public subsidies or other incentive
programs for short-term viability.94 In the last decade, renewable energy was one
of the fastest growing sectors in the United States economy.95 As Table 3
illustrates, the states with the largest amounts of farmland are also often the states
that today produce the greatest amount of renewable energy—suggesting
significant overlap between local support and demand for renewable energy and
the size of a state’s agricultural sector. Of the sixteen states with over twenty-five
million acres in cultivation, twelve of them rank in the top third of states for
current renewable-energy generation. Given the potential opportunities, many
farmers and ranchers are already taking advantage of federal and state subsidies
and incentives to produce renewable energy.

94. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 309 (noting that renewable energy currently
costs significantly more than fossil fuel).
95. See 25x’25, MEETING THE GOAL: A PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www
.infrastructureusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/25x25progressreport1.pdf (noting that U.S.
renewable energy grew by almost twenty-five percent from 2004 through 2009 and now surpasses the
nuclear power sector in total energy produced).
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Table 3
States with Over 25 Million Acres of Farmland in 2007
State

Arizona
California
Colorado
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Texas
Wyoming

Farmland
Ranking96
15
16
9
14
10
3
13
12
2
4
6
7
8
5
1
11

Ranking by
Current
Renewable
Generation97
14
2
19
29
10
33
12
36
9
47
40
22
15
20
5
31

Ranking by
Wind Energy
Potential98
24
18
12
14
7
2
10
13
5
3
11
6
9
4
1
8

Farms and ranches can profit from the production of a wide variety of
renewable energy sources, including crop-based biofuels (ranging from the current
generation of corn-based ethanol to future cellulosic fuels), biopower from the
burning of biomass or from biodigestors, geothermal, hydroelectric, solar
(including photovoltaic, solar-thermal heating, and large-scale solar), and wind.99
Of these sources, biofuels, biopower, and wind currently offer the greatest
potential to farmers. Neither geothermal nor hydroelectric production is growing
96. Rank in total acres devoted to farming operations. Table shows only those states with
more than twenty-five million acres in farms in 2007. Source: U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC.
STATISTICS SERV., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, VOL. 1, CH. 2, TABLE 8.
97. Rank by total renewable net generation. States with grey shading are those states in the
top third of all U.S. states for current renewable net generation. Source: U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PROFILES (2009), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/ cneaf/solar.renewables/page/state_profiles/r_profiles_sum.html.
98.
Rank by annual generation capacity of wind within each state. States with grey shading
are those states in the top third of all U.S. states for wind generation capacity. Source: NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ESTIMATES OF WINDY LAND AREA AND WIND ENERGY POTENTIAL
BY STATE FOR AREAS >= 30% CAPACITY FACTOR AT 80M (2010), available at http://www.wind
poweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wind_maps/wind_potential_80m_30percent.pdf.
99. STEPHEN HERBERT ET AL., UNIV. OF MASS. EXTENSION, RENEWABLE ENERGY
PRODUCTION ON FARMS (n.d.), available at http://www.umass.edu/cdl/BMPs/RenewableEnergy
Prod.onFarms09-54.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
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rapidly, and both depend on highly localized sources of energy.100 The solar sector
is growing more rapidly than any other energy sector except wind,101 but the
footprint for large-scale solar is sizable and could require farmers to dedicate
significant amounts of agricultural land to solar facilities and away from crops.102
The remainder of this section therefore focuses on biofuels, biopower, and wind
energy.
1.

Biofuels and Biopower

The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates that a tripling in use of biomass
in the United States could bring twenty billion dollars in additional income to
farmers and rural communities, while significantly reducing emissions of greenhouse
gases.103 Of the various biomass options, ethanol has received the greatest attention
in recent years, in part because ethanol is currently the only competitive option to
petroleum in powering motor vehicles.104 The federal government has strongly
pushed ethanol production over the last decade. The federal government has directly
subsidized the production of ethanol through tax credits.105 The United States also
has adopted renewable fuel standards requiring increased use of ethanol.106 States
have used tax policy and renewable fuel standards to promote the local use and
production of ethanol.107 As a result, production of corn-based ethanol tripled from
2004 to 2009—serviced by approximately 200 biorefineries and blended into about
eighty percent of the nation’s gasoline.108
100. For discussions of geothermal and hydroelectric outlooks, see 25x’25, supra note 95, at
16–18.
101. See id. at 7, 14 (solar grew forty-one percent from 2004 to 2009).
102. For a discussion of the potential for solar production on farms, see UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FACT SHEET: UP WITH THE SUN: SOLAR ENERGY AND AGRICULTURE
(n.d.), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/agfs_solar_2003.pdf (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010). Some companies are now examining whether solar panels might potentially aid
agriculture by shading crops that favor less sunlight. See, e.g., Susan DeFreitas, Solar Panels to Shade
Organic Crops, EARTH TECHLING (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.earthtechling.com/2011/09/solar
panels-to-shade-organic-crops.
103. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FACT SHEET: GROWING ENERGY ON THE FARM:
BIOMASS ENERGY AND AGRICULTURE (n.d.), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents
/clean_energy/agfs_biomass_2003.pdf (last visited last Nov. 14, 2010).
104. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 309 (noting that biofuels can be used in
internal combustion engines and thus do not require major transformations in automobiles).
105. OFFICE OF SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO FEDERAL BIOFUEL
INCENTIVES (2006), available at http://cantwell.senate.gov/services/biofuels/comprehensive
_guide_to_federal%20biofuel_incentives.pdf.
106. Renewable fuel standards under the Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007
require the annual production of thirty-six billion gallons of renewable fuels by 2022. Daniel de la
Torre Ugarte et al., ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
LEGISLATION TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 1 (2009), available at http://beag.ag.utk.edu/pp
/ut_climate_energy%20report_25x%2725Nov30.pdf. See also AMERICAN COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE
ENERGY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. RENEWABLE ENERGY FIELD IN 2009 8 (2009).
107. See, e.g., FRISMAN, supra note 74; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 312–13.
108. 25x’25, supra note 95, at 9.
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Corn-based ethanol, which is the principal form of ethanol currently
produced in the United States, has attracted significant criticism. Scientific and
economic studies have questioned whether the use of corn-based ethanol in place
of petroleum reduces greenhouse gases, while attacking corn-based ethanol for its
actual and potential impacts on world food prices, conservation, local air
pollution, and water resources.109
Research is underway, however, on new generations of ethanol that scientists
believe will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and carry fewer negative
environmental and social side effects than corn-based ethanol. Cellulosic ethanol,
produced from fast-growing switch grass or crop residuals, holds the greatest
promise, both for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and for providing a
significant source of additional income for farmers.110 The Oak Ridge National
Laboratory estimates that ethanol produced from switch grass could increase net
farm income across the United States by almost six billion dollars, while cellulosic
ethanol produced from leftover corn stover and wheat straw could add an
additional two billion dollars.111 The Union of Concerned Scientists believes that
farmers could also harvest energy crops for cellulosic ethanol on land managed for
other environmental benefits under federal conservation programs such as the
Conservation Reserve Program—thus providing multiple ecosystem services
simultaneously.112 Cellulosic ethanol, however, is still in an early research phase
and thus currently costs substantially more than either corn-based ethanol or
petroleum.113
Ethanol is not the only biofuel of potential interest to farmers. Biodiesel, for
example, also holds promise as an area of potential agricultural income growth.
Spurred by a focused federal tax credit, the biodiesel industry enjoyed exponential
growth for part of the last decade, but collapsed when the tax credit expired.114
Biomethane similarly offers a substitute for methane that can be used either to
generate electricity or as vehicle fuel. Manure from dairy farms or other
109. See KRISTINA E. PHIPPS ET AL., THE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF LARGE-SCALE
PRODUCTION OF BIOFUELS (2007), available at http://woods.stanford.edu/docs/biofuels/Biofuels
Commentary.pdf (discussing the challenges posed by corn-based ethanol). A collection of papers
regarding the potential problems of corn-based ethanol can be found at Biofuels Workshop, WOODS
INST. FOR THE ENV’T, http://woods.stanford.edu/ideas/biofuels/results.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2010); see also Rosamond L. Naylor et al., The Ripple Effect: Biofuels, Food Security, and the Environment, 49
ENV’T 30 (2007) (discussing the potential impacts of biofuels on food prices).
110. 25x’25, supra note 95, at 10; SARAH BRECHBILL & WALLACE E. TYNER, PURDUE
EXTENSION, THE ECONOMICS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY: CORN STOVER AND SWITCHGRASS
(2008), available at http://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/ID/ID-404.pdf.
111. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 103 (describing the study by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, based on price of less than $40 per dry ton delivered of either switch grass or
corn stover/wheat straw).
112. Id. (noting that a co-op in Iowa is currently using CRP land to grow switch grass for a
local power plant).
113. Naylor et al., supra note 109, at 34.
114. 25x’25, supra note 95, at 10.
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agricultural operations can be used to generate biomethane-producing power as
well as reducing emissions of methane (a potent greenhouse gas) and improving
local water quality.115 Both the U.S. Department of Agriculture and local
governments have actively promoted biomethane, although the current level of
production remains low.116
The major obstacle to the growth of biofuel production is cost. No biomassbased fuel is currently cost competitive with fossil fuels. Given current technology
and processes, for example, ethanol is not competitive with petroleum unless the
price of oil rises substantially.117 Part of the reason is the significant subsidy the
federal government currently provides to fossil fuels.118 More importantly,
biofuels are still in their infancy; like all renewable fuels, costs are still quite high
compared to theoretical cost levels and almost certainly will decline over time.119
At least three policies can help speed the growth of the biofuel market. First,
the federal government can help ensure that biofuels are not at an unwarranted
cost disadvantage by reducing the current subsidy advantage given to fossil fuels,
ensuring that fossil fuel prices reflect pollution costs, and helping to defray the
costs of new infrastructure needed to produce, distribute, and use biofuels.
Second, to promote use in early stages of development, the federal and state
government can mandate increased use of biofuels through renewable fuel
standards.120 Finally, the government can subsidize or otherwise help finance basic
research and development for new biofuels, recognizing that research is generally
underfunded in the private market.121 The government has taken steps along all
three of these lines,122 although the government’s policies have shifted over time,
creating uncertainty about long-term governmental support and thereby
undermining longer-term investments.
115. See John Addison, Biomethane for Energy and Fuel, CLEANTECH BLOG (June 25, 2009),
http://www.cleantechblog.com/2009/06/biomethane-for-energy-and-fuel.html (describing the
potential benefits of biomethane).
116. Id.
117. YANG JUN ET AL., GLOBAL IMPACT PATHWAYS OF BIOFUELS AND (ON) THE POOR
(n.d.), available at http://www.berkeleybioeconomy.com/wp-content/uploads//2011/04/Rozelle.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
118. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 310 (noting that the subsidies provided to
fossil fuels are approximately two-and-one-half times those provided to the renewable sector).
119. See, e.g., Naylor et al., supra note 109, at 34 (discussing the current cost disadvantages of
cellulosic ethanol).
120. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 312 (describing California’s adoption of a
low-carbon fuel standard, and noting the increasing interest among other states in adopting a similar
standard). Renewable fuel standards, however, require careful design in order to avoid perverse
effects. Id. at 313.
121. See, e.g., id. at 311 (noting that private markets do not provide an optimum level of energy
research).
122. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Showcases New
Energy Opportunities for Rural America, Visits Pennsylvania Biofuels Producer (May 7, 2010), available at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid= 2010/05/0236.xml
(listing key energy provisions of the federal Farm Bill making funds available to support biofuel production).

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

1198
2.

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

[Vol. 1:1167

Wind Energy

The production of wind energy also promises significant revenue in broad
regions of the United States. Wind energy is the fastest expanding of the renewable
energy sectors, growing 1000% during the 2000s.123 Wind constituted over a third of
new power installations in 2009.124 Wind energy, moreover, could ultimately provide
a high percentage of the total electricity used in the United States.125
Wind production is likely to be a particularly attractive source of revenue for
many farmers. As Table 3 shows, there is an exceptionally high correlation between
states with sizable agricultural economies and states with large wind potential. The
same flat terrain that characterizes much of the best farmland in the United States
also provides favorable conditions for wind production. Of the sixteen states with
over twenty-five million acres of farmland, fourteen of them are among the third of
the states with the greatest potential for wind-energy production. Conversely, the
twelve states with the greatest wind potential all have sizable amounts of farmland.
Wind energy also requires a relatively small footprint,126 making it compatible with
growing crops or raising livestock and allowing farmers to bring in additional
income with little if any sacrifice to their traditional business.
Wind developers offer a variety of types of revenue to farmers willing to
locate turbines on their land, including up-front payments, fixed annual lease
payments, and a share in wind revenue.127 Studies have found that the income
from wind production can provide a significant source of farm income and
outweigh any losses in farming income from the land lost to production.128 Yearly
royalties for wind production currently range from two thousand to ten thousand
dollars per turbine.129
Like biofuels, wind is still more expensive than alternative fossil-fuel options,
although the cost of wind has fallen rapidly and is expected to continue to
decline.130 So long as wind remains at a cost disadvantage to fossil fuels,
123. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 308; see also UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, FACT SHEET: FARMING THE WIND: WIND POWER AND AGRICULTURE (n.d.), available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/agfs_wind_2003.pdf (last visited Nov.
14, 2010) (noting that wind power is the fastest-growing energy source in the world).
124. See 25x’25, supra note 95, at 12 (thirty-nine percent of new power installations in 2009
were wind facilities).
125. See, e.g., Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Path to Sustainable Energy by 2030, SCI.
AM., Nov. 2009, at 58 (describing the potential for wind energy); UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, supra note 103 (noting that wind could produce five times more electricity than the
United States currently uses).
126. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 103 (“Large wind turbines typically
use less than half an acre of land, including access roads, so farmers can continue to plant crops and
graze livestock right up to the base of the turbine.”).
127. Id.
128. 25x’25, supra note 95, at 11.
129. PATRICK MAZZA, COMMUNITY WIND 101: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2008),
available at http://www.ef.org/docs/CommWind_web.pdf.
130. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 103 (noting that the cost of
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government assistance and mandates will remain necessary to promote greater
development of wind power in rural areas. The government already has funded a
variety of programs, including the federal Department of Energy’s Wind Powering
America initiative.131 The Union of Concerned Scientists estimate that this
initiative alone could bring sixty billion dollars in capital investment to rural
America and over one billion dollars in new income to farmers and other rural
landowners.132
Wind farms also face a variety of other obstacles. First, with some
exceptions, major wind areas are far from major population centers,133 and most
lack high-voltage transmission lines connecting them to cities and other major
centers of demand.134 To recognize the full potential of wind energy, new
transmission lines will therefore be needed. Second and equally problematic, wind
energy is intermittent, reducing its current value as an energy source.135 Until largescale energy storage becomes possible, wind power will remain in a purely
supportive role. Finally, wind energy faces various environmental concerns,
including potential harm to birds and aesthetics.136
Community wind programs, in which groups of rural landowners develop
collaborative projects to furnish local energy, provide an alternative means of
promoting wind energy in those regions that are distant from major cities.137 One
study by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory found that local economic
benefits from a community wind program can be several times larger than the
benefits from standard corporate wind projects.138 Unfortunately, community
wind programs also can suffer from diseconomies of scale, and federal and state
programs designed to promote wind energy are designed with large-scale
commercial programs in mind, so that community wind programs often do not
qualify.139
B. Reduced Climate Risks
Another major business opportunity in the future for EcoFarming may be in
sequestering carbon or reducing emissions of major greenhouse gases such as
methane and nitrous oxide.140 The current opportunity for profiting from climateproducing wind power has dropped 90% since 1980).
131. See Wind Powering America, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, www.windpoweringamerica.gov.
132. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 103.
133. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 308.
134. 25x’25, supra note 95, at 4, 14.
135. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 308.
136. Id.
137. See MAZZA, supra note 129 (describing community wind programs).
138. Id. at 4.
139. See id. at 5 (describing the difficulties in using existing governmental incentive programs
for community wind programs).
140. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Gramig, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Offsets from Agriculture: Opportunities
and Challenges, in ADAPTING AGRICULTURE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 179, 181, available at http://nabc
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mitigation practices is limited, largely because of Congress’s failure through 2011
to pass major climate legislation that would drive a market for agricultural actions.
However, the market is likely to grow over time as states and regions adopt
climate mitigation programs and, if the United States ultimately adopts a strict
regulatory program that permits agriculture to play a major role in reducing and
sequestering greenhouse gas emissions, the financial opportunity could be
substantial.
Offset programs will be the principal source of opportunity. Most climatemitigation regulation, both actual and proposed and both domestic and overseas,
requires various entities, such as power plants or factories, to reduce their
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, but typically exempts
agriculture from direct regulation. However, most climate mitigation programs
generally allow regulated entities to meet their reduction requirements by paying
nonregulated entities such as farmers either to reduce their emissions or sequester
greenhouse gases. The regulated entities can then offset their own reduction
requirements by the amounts that the nonregulated entities have either reduced or
sequestered the relevant gases. Most regulatory programs, in short, create offset
markets for greenhouse gas reductions and sequestration.141
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) (also known as the
Waxman-Markey bill), which the House of Representatives passed in June 2009,
illustrates the opportunity.142 ACES would not have regulated agricultural
emissions of greenhouse gases, but provided for offsets from a variety of activities
including agricultural practices. The bill specifically listed tillage, crop covers,
fertilizer reductions, and the capture and combustion of biogas as potential
sources of offsets.
All climate programs require that offsets meet at least three requirements:
verifiability, additionality, and enforceability.143 Offsets are “verifiable” if scientific
techniques exist to quantify the amount of carbon equivalents that are offset by a
particular action.144 Offsets are “additional” if farmers would not have engaged in
the specific activity if it had not been for the offset program; some mitigation
programs go a step further and require that there be no other incentive to engage

.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/nabc_21/nabc21_module4_gramig.pdf (proceedings of a conference at Univ.
of Saskatchewa, June 24-26, 2009) (noting that agriculture, along with forestry, is one of the “most
commonly considered sources of offsets”).
141. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 141–43 (describing proposed U.S. capand-trade programs, including the role of offsets).
142. See JULIA OLMSTEAD, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY, U.S.
CLIMATE POLICY AND AGRICULTURE 2 (2009) (summarizing the ACES offset program).
143. Gramig, supra note 140, at 183. Verifiability is sometimes broken into two separate
requirements: (1) the ability to quantify the offset, and (2) the ability to verify it.
144. See, e.g., OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OREGON AG CARBON WORKING GROUP REPORT 3
(2009), available at http://www.oregon.gov/oda/docs/pdf/agcarbonrpt12_09.pdf?ga=t. The goal is to
ensure that the offsets are as “real and measurable” as the emissions that they offset. Id.
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in the practice other than the existence of the offset.145 Offsets are “enforceable”
if legal contracts exist that require compliance and that can be enforced in court.
The first two requirements can currently pose significant obstacles for many
types of agricultural offsets.146 Of foremost importance, there is often insufficient
data and information to measure the quantity of carbon sequestered through
potentially important agricultural practices, including soil sequestration projects.147
University scientists and governmental agencies such as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture are developing new tools to help in measuring agricultural offset
programs, but more work is needed.148 In many cases, there are also factors
beyond offset credits driving those farming practices that yield offset
opportunities, raising questions about the additionality of the offsets.
Ideally, offsets are also “permanent” (i.e., any carbon sequestered is removed
permanently from the ambient environment and cannot be later released), and a
number of climate programs currently require permanence of offsets.149 This again
can pose a problem for some agricultural offsets, including soil sequestration.
Some programs may decide to recognize nonpermanent offsets if the offset will
last for a long enough period of time to have a meaningful impact on climate and
serve as an effective bridge to later permanent reductions from other sources.150
In such cases, however, climate programs are likely to discount the value of the
offset to reflect its limited life.
1.

Options

Studies suggest that farmers may be able to produce significant offsets
through a variety of changes in farming practices, including no-till or conservation
tillage, the use of winter cover crops, and reduced fertilizer use. Ranchers can
increase soil sequestration of carbon by improving their grazing management.151
Ranchers and dairies can reduce methane emissions by changing their feeding and
145. Id. at 3–4.
146. See OLMSTEAD, supra note 142, at 3 (noting that agricultural offset programs are
“notoriously difficult to measure and verify” and also frequently run into additionality problems).
147. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 1, 5.
148. Id. at 7 (describing the development by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Colorado
State University of a “Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases-Carbon Management Evaluation
Tool”); Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2088–89.
149. Gramig, supra note 140, at 183; DANIEL A. SUMNER, UNIV. OF CAL. AGRIC. ISSUES
CTR., AB 32 AND AGRICULTURE (2010), available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/AB32/ab32sumner2.
pdf (describing the requirement under California’s climate legislation that offsets be permanent and
not reversible); ENVIRONMENT-NORTHEAST, OFFSETS SUMMARY: THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE
GAS INITIATIVE (2008), available at http://www.env-ne.org/public/resources/pdf/ene_rggi _offsetdesign.pdf (offsets under RGGI must be permanent).
150. Gramig, supra note 140, at 185.
151. For a complete list of options, see ALISON J. EAGLE ET AL., NICHOLS INSTITUTE FOR
ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POTENTIAL OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: A SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE
(2010).
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manure-management practices.152 Shifts in land use are also a potential source of
offsets. Farmers can sequester carbon by shifting the use of some or all of their
land from traditional crops to either forestry (afforestation) or short-rotation
woody crops, combining crops with trees and shrubs in close proximity in a
practice known as agroforestry, and converting cropland back to natural landscape
or unharvested vegetation.153
The viability of particular offsets will depend on the price paid for the offsets
(which in turn will depend on the stringency of the regulatory system and the
potential supply of offsets), the cost of the offsets, and the ability to meet the
requirements set out earlier (including verifiability, additionality, and permanence).
Some forms of offsets will not be cost effective even at high carbon prices. While
agriculture technically may be able to mitigate up to 6,000 metric tons of carbon
equivalents each year by 2030, economically profitable offsets are likely to range
from about 1,500 metric tons at a price of twenty dollars per metric ton to
approximately 4,300 metric tons at one hundred dollars.154 As these figures show,
however, the potential opportunity is still large even at low prices.
a.

Carbon Sequestration Through Tillage Practices

Greatest attention has focused on increasing the sequestration of carbon in
agriculture soils either by not plowing the soil (no-till) or reducing tillage
(conservation tillage).155 Soil already sequesters substantial amounts of carbon,
holding twice as much carbon as the atmosphere and surface vegetation
combined.156 Studies estimate that no-till and conservation tillage could sequester
anywhere from approximately thirty metric tons of carbon-dioxide equivalents per
year to over 170 metric tons.157 Improved tillage practices also carry a variety of
potential advantages to agriculture beyond carbon sequestration, including
reduced soil erosion, enhanced soil quality, and reduced fertilizer needs, promising
cobenefits but potentially raising questions about additionality.158
The use of winter cover crops also can increase soil sequestration of carbon,

152. Gramig, supra note 140, at 181.
153. See, e.g., F. Montagnini & P.K.R. Nair, Carbon Sequestration: An Underexploited Environmental
Benefit of Agroforestry Systems, 61 AGROFORESTRY SYSTEMS 281 (2004); Sten Nilsson & Wolfgang
Schopfhauser, The Carbon-Sequestration Potential of a Global Afforestation Program, 30 CLIMATE CHANGE
267 (1995).
154. Gramig, supra note 137, at 182.
155. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 151, at 3; Gramig, supra note 140, at 181; SUSTAINABLE
CONSERVATION, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. & NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROFITABILITY 7
(n.d.), available at http://www.suscon.org/cowpower/pdfs/CaliforniaAgricultureandClimate Change.
pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
156. SUSTAINABLE CONSERVATION ET AL., supra note 155, at 7.
157. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 151, at 5.
158. Id. at 3 n.4.
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as well as reduce nitrous oxide emissions.159 Studies estimate that use of winter
cover crops can reduce carbon-equivalent emissions by anywhere from
approximately thirty-five to eighty-five metric tons per year.160 Cover crops also
provide a variety of other potential agricultural benefits, including weed
suppression, insect reduction, and nitrogen fixing for some crops.161
b.

Reducing Nitrous Oxides Through Fertilizer and Manure Practices

Because both nitrogen fertilizer and manure can produce nitrous oxide
emissions, farmers can also reduce climate risks by (1) matching fertilizer
applications more closely to crop needs, (2) reducing soil saturation through
irrigation practices, (3) better managing manure through dry handling or
composting, and (4) installing and using methane digesters.162 Nitrous oxide is a
particularly potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential 280 times that
of carbon dioxide, making these practices a particularly valuable means of
addressing climate change.163
c.

Reducing Methane Emissions Through Livestock Practices

Livestock operations currently emit significant amounts of methane through
“enteric fermentation,” the process by which livestock digest their food.164 Like
nitrous oxide, methane is a potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential
fifty-six times greater than carbon dioxide.165 Farmers have a variety of means
through which they can reduce methane emissions, including changes in the diet
that they feed their livestock.166
d.

Biological Sequestration of Carbon

In many projections, the principal means by which offsets will be generated
is through biological sequestration of carbon.167 In the agricultural sector, most

159. SUSTAINABLE CONSERVATION ET AL., supra note 155, at 8; EAGLE ET AL., supra note
151, at 11.
160. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 151, at 12.
161. See PRESTON SULLIVAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE TECH., APPROPRIATE TECH.
TRANSFER FOR RURAL AREAS, OVERVIEW OF COVER CROPS AND GREEN MANURES (2003),
available at http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/covercrop.html.
162. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 151, at 28–35; Gramig, supra note 140, at 181; OR. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., supra note 144, at 8, 10–11. See also SUMNER, supra note 149 (noting the potential value to
farmers of methane digesters).
163. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 126.
164. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 10.
165. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 126.
166. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 11.
167. See, e.g., 25x’25 CARBON WORK GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE
BIOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY
ACT OF 2009 (2009), available at http://www.25x25.org/storage/25x25/documents/carbon
_subcommittee/25x25%20cwg%20hr%202454%20bio-seq%20recommendations%209_03_09.pdf.
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attention has focused on afforestation, in which farmers replace their traditional
crops with forests. At relatively high prices for carbon, farmers may find that
replacing crop and pasture lands with forests is economically profitable because of
the offsets earned.168
A second option for biological sequestration of carbon that is more
compatible with traditional farming is agroforestry, in which farmers integrate
crops with trees and shrubs. Principal agroforestry practices include the use of
windbreaks, alley cropping, silvopasture, riparian buffers, and forest farming.169
Alleycropping, silvopasture, and forest farming have particular promise for carbon
sequestration because of their more intensive use of trees.170
2.

Potential Benefits to Agriculture

Offset programs could bring significant new revenues to farmers who are
willing to manage their land to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and sequester
carbon, with the amount of revenue depending both on the stringency of the
climate regulation and the percent of commitments that the regulatory system
permits to be met through offsets. For example, the Nicholas Institute for the
Environment at Duke University estimates that payments for offsets could reach
one-and-a-half billion dollars annually if carbon is priced at thirty dollars per
metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalents (which is within the range of predicted
prices from most national climate legislation).171 Financial benefits from offsets
would be relatively widespread throughout the U.S. agricultural sector.172
Projections of potential revenue to individual sectors have also been large.
Inform Economics, for example, has estimated that no-till practices could bring in
over thirty dollars per acre to corn farmers.173 A 2009 study by the University of
Tennessee found that, over a fifteen-year period, a broad offset program would
provide returns of $91 million for wheat, $131 million for corn, and $196 million
for soybeans.174 The sale of offsets from methane capture could bring in $328
million more.175
One frequently expressed concern has been that carbon offset programs
168. See, e.g., Gramig, supra note 140, at 182 (suggesting that crop and pasture lands will be
converted at carbon equivalent prices of thirty dollars or more per ton).
169. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 151, at 18–20.
170. Id. at 19. See also id. at 20 Table 9 (showing the national potential for sequestration by
alleycropping ranging from 67.7 to 270.8 metric tons of carbon-dioxide equivalents).
171. JESSICA SHIPLEY ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S.
AGRICULTURE & CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION: MARKETS, MYTHS & OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2010),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docuploads/us-agriculture-climate-change-legislationmarkets-myths-opportunities.pdf.
172. Ugarte, supra note 106, at 17.
173. SHIPLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 9 (based on a projected adoption rate of sixty-three
percent of total acreage).
174. Ugarte, supra note 106, at 10.
175. Id. at 12.
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could lead to the conversion of substantial amounts of farmland into forests,
driving up food prices and devastating rural communities dependent on
agricultural revenue.176 The projections that have led to this concern, however,
have not accounted for alternative forms of offsets that farmers might find more
attractive.177 The amount of afforestation that will actually occur will depend on
the price of carbon offsets. The 2009 University of Tennessee study mentioned
above projects that little afforestation would occur at carbon dioxide prices of
twenty-seven dollars per metric ton (which is again in the general range of prices
expected under climate bills that have been considered by Congress), because
traditional crops outcompete the income from offsets.178 Significant conversion
does not occur under the Tennessee model until prices reach about eighty dollars
per metric ton, which is substantially higher than currently predicted carbon
dioxide prices but within the realm of possibility with strict regulatory
standards.179 Other studies have found that offsets would have relatively minimal
impact on food production and thus food prices.180
3.

The Prospect for Offset Programs

Pending a federal climate bill, there are three potential sources of funding for
farmers wishing to sequester carbon or reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
their operations. First, a number of programs under the federal farm bill
encourage agricultural practices that sequester carbon. For example, the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) rewards farmers who convert
from conventional to no-till farming or improve their manure handling, while the
Conservation Stewardship Program pays farmers who previously converted to
reduced or no-till farming.181
Emerging state and regional climate mitigation programs may provide a
second source of potential revenue.182 In 1997, Oregon became the first state to
address climate change when its legislature authorized the Oregon Energy Facility
Siting Council to set carbon dioxide emission standards for new energy facilities.
If a facility cannot meet the Oregon carbon dioxide standard directly through
plant design, it can meet the standard either by developing and funding offset

176. SHIPLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 14.
177. Id.
178. Ugarte, supra note 106, at 13; see also SHIPLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 14 (discussing the
Tennessee study).
179. Ugarte, supra note 106, at 15. The Tennessee study predicts that, at prices of about $160
per metric ton, about forty million acres of cropland would convert to forests. Id.
180. See, e.g., id. at 13 (finding that changes to crop prices would be within ten percent, “a
magnitude typical to those caused by normal market forces”).
181. See OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 7, 11 (describing incentives under these
programs, as well as the Conservation Reserve Program).
182. These offset markets are not limited to the United States. Alberta and British Columbia,
Canada, also have significant offset programs for agriculture, including soil sequestration. Id. at 4.
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projects or by paying a predetermined amount (currently $1.27 per short ton of
carbon dioxide) to a state-recognized nonprofit that selects and manages offset
projects.183 This law led to the creation of the nonprofit Climate Trust, which now
also creates and manages offsets for state programs in Colorado, Massachusetts,
Montana, and Washington.184 The Oregon offset program is open to agricultural
producers, although verifiability is a significant issue.185
California’s climate legislation, AB 32, could generate significant offset
opportunities for the state’s agriculture.186 AB 32 chose not to regulate agriculture
directly for administrative (and probably political) reasons, but allows agricultural
offsets.187 The California Air Resources Board (CARB), which is responsible for
implementing AB 32, has identified a number of agricultural practices that may
provide significant offsets, including cover crops, tillage practices, and methane
digesters.188 Because CARB is still designing California’s carbon market, the size
of the opportunity that a future offset market will provide to the state’s farmers is
still an open question and will depend, once again, in part on resolving often
difficult questions of verifiability and additionality.
The New England states’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) may
also generate offset opportunities for farmers in states that are party to RGGI.
RGGI regulates the carbon emissions of regional power plants and permits limited
offsets. Of most relevance to agriculture, RGGI currently permits offsets for
methane destruction and reforestation of cropland, although offset use by regional
power plants is currently limited to only 3.3% of the plants’ compliance
obligation.189
Voluntary cap-and-trade markets currently provide a final set of offset
opportunities. Governmental carbon legislation will ultimately crowd out and
replace the existing voluntary market (which often operates under slack standards),
but that market currently provides a small yet significant opportunity to farmers
wishing to sell agricultural offsets. The largest formal program in this voluntary
marketplace is the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). From 2003 through 2010,
CCX was a cap-and-trade program in which a number of private companies
voluntarily committed to reduce their carbon emissions and then met their targets

183. BILL DRUMHELLER, OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTRODUCTION TO THE OREGON
CARBON DIOXIDE STANDARD (2010), available at http://www.oregon.gov/energy/siting/docs
/rulemaking/Intro_to_Carbon_Dioxide_Standard.pdf?ga=t.
184. CLIMATE TRUST, CLIMATE OFFSET WORK, http://www.climatetrust.org/compliance
_off.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
185. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 4.
186. See generally SUMNER, supra note 151 (providing a general overview of AB 32 and
agricultural impacts).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087; ENVIRONMENT-NORTHEAST, supra note 149, at 1–
2; SHIPLEY ET AL., supra note 168, at 4.
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either through direct reductions, by purchasing carbon credits from other
members, or by purchasing offsets from nonmembers, including farmers; since
2010, CCX has run an offset program (the Chicago Climate Exchange Offsets
Registry Program) available to qualified participants.190 CCX currently permits
offsets for various agricultural practices, including soil sequestration, methane
destruction, and reforestation of cropland.191 Soil sequestration accounted for
almost half of the thirty-five million metric tons of CO2 traded on the CCX
between 2003 and 2008.192
The voluntary market consists not only of CCX but also a diverse variety of
other private and nonprofit organizations promoting carbon reduction and
markets. Together, these other organizations trade significantly more carbon than
CCX—slightly more than forty million tons in 2007 alone.193 However, in contrast
to the significance of farm offsets to the CCX exchange, farms contributed only a
small percentage (probably less than ten percent) of the carbon offsets in this
broader market.194 Most of these offsets involved either soil sequestration or
methane destruction.195
One lesson from the existing state and voluntary offset programs is the
importance of aggregators. Most programs look for offsets of a minimum size,
which often can be too large for an individual farm to provide. Individual farmers,
however, can use aggregators who bundle individual farm projects together and
sell them through a state or voluntary program. In some cases, local farm bureaus
or other agricultural trade organizations have created aggregators to work with
their members.196
Unfortunately, where existing state, regional, or voluntary carbon programs
do not provide a sufficient incentive to engage in current carbon-mitigating
practices, the potential for future offsets actually might undermine current
adoption of favorable practices. Because of additionality concerns, most carbon
mitigation programs are unlikely to provide offsets for steps taken long before the
adoption of the authorizing legislation; otherwise, offsets might be awarded for

190. See OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 4 (discussing the role that CCX played in
facilitating offsets, including agricultural offsets); CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE, FACT SHEET
(Dec. 2011), available at https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ccx/CCX_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter
FACT SHEET]; Markets: Chicago Climate Exchange, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC.,
https://www.theice.com/ccx.jhtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
191. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087.
192. Id. According to CCX, its “protocols pioneered practices in the agriculture sector,
facilitating the participation of more than 15,000 farmers, ranchers and foresters who conduct
mitigation practices on more than 25 million acres of land.” FACT SHEET, supra note 190, at 4.
193. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2088.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 144, at 4 (highlighting the Woodlands Carbon
Company, which was created in 2008 by the Oregon Small Woodlands Association (OSWA), in
partnership with the American Forest Foundation).
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reductions that would have occurred in any case.197 Farmers thinking about
adopting such practices therefore may wait in the hope of ultimately being
rewarded for the practices.
C. Hydrologic Services
Hydrologic services already provide funding for some farmers and enjoy
significant future potential. Most of the opportunity, both now and in the future,
lies in agricultural practices that can increase water quality—primarily through
protection of wetlands and other riparian buffers. Farms, however, also can help
reduce downstream flood risks to densely populated areas by agreeing to serve as
flood areas during periods of high water flow. Farms also may be able to increase
the quantity of water available for consumptive uses or improve flow for
hydroelectric purposes, although it is difficult to determine how various farming
practices contribute to these latter services and, partly as a result, there are few
examples of payments that have been made for them.
1.

Water Quality

At least four sources of funding already exist for farmers wishing to promote
water quality, and the amount of funding is likely to grow over time. First, several
federal farm programs provide direct cost-sharing or compensation to farmers
who agree to manage their land for water quality. For example, the principal
purpose of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the oldest and best known
of the farm conservation programs, is to retire highly erodible and
environmentally sensitive land from crop production to reduce erosion and water
pollution.198 The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) pays farmers to protect,
restore, and enhance wetlands on their property, in part to protect and improve
water quality.199 The Conservation Security Program (CSP) rewards good stewards
who adopt new practices to improve local water quality.200
Second, a number of cities, driven to protect the sources of their water in large
part by governmental regulation, have paid farmers to manage agricultural land in
the cities’ watersheds to protect and improve water quality.201 In the best-known
example related earlier, New York City has paid farmers to improve their land
management in the city’s Delaware and Catskills watersheds. Other major cities,
including Boston and Seattle, have also invested in watershed improvement.202

197. Id. at 1.
198. Cox, supra note 3, at 146.
199. See id. at 148.
200. Id. at 147.
201. For general discussions of the efforts of cities, both in the United States and abroad, to
protect their watersheds for water quality purposes, see Postel & Thompson, supra note 42, at 104–
05, and Salzman et al., supra note 7, at 313–19, 329–31.
202. Salzman et al., supra note 7, at 329–31.
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Absent pressure from governmental regulation, however, most water
suppliers seem uninterested in paying watershed farmers to manage their lands for
reduced water pollution. The principal regulatory driver in the United States,
EPA’s Surface Water Treatment Rule, applies only to water suppliers who do not
filter their water, and the vast majority of water suppliers—over ninety-five
percent—filter.203 In a 2005 survey, major water suppliers in California reported
having taken few actions within the prior decade to protect watershed lands that
they did not own.204
Third, water quality trading under the Clean Water Act is likely to drive
significant demand for on-farm measures to reduce nonpoint pollution. Under
rules established by EPA, states can develop trading programs under which point
sources of pollution, such as factories and wastewater treatment plants, can
partially meet their discharge standards by paying others, including farmers, to
reduce their discharges. Water quality trading is still in its infancy in the United
States and faces difficult technical hurdles presented by the need to determine
how emission reductions in one location will affect water quality in another
location.205 Although tighter water quality regulation has driven the number of
trading programs to grow from only eight in 1995 to approximately one hundred
today, most of the programs are only experimental pilots, and just one program
(involving the Long Island Sound) accounts for eighty percent of the trades to
date.206 More importantly, agriculture is a potential source of credits in only fifteen
of the trading programs, and only three of these have involved actual trades with
farmers.207 The most common form of pollutant for these programs is
nutrients,208 although similar water quality trading in Australia has successfully
addressed salinity and other water quality problems.209
A recent study of wetlands restoration in the Mississippi alluvial valley
illustrates the potential importance of water quality markets, as well as the
opportunity for EcoFarming more generally.210 The study examined opportunities

203.
204.
205.

Thompson, supra note 16, at 480 n.70.
Id. at 106–07. The survey covered water retailers with fifty thousand or more customers. Id.
ELLEN HANAK ET AL., MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S WATER: FROM CONFLICT TO
RECONCILIATION 286–89 (2011); SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 170–71 (noting that the
“problem of determining whether a particular trade will ensure that overall pollution remains the
same is particularly difficult in the case of point/non-point trades”).
206. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 171.
207. Marc Ribaudo & C.J. Nickerson, Agriculture and Water Quality Trading: Exploring the
Possibilities, 64 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 1, 2 (2009); Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087.
208. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087.
209. M.D. YOUNG, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF WATER USE IN
AGRICULTURE: THE EXPERIENCE OF AND LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN WATER REFORM
PROGRAMME 8 (2008), available at http://www.myoung.net.au/water/publications/oecd
_lessons_paper.pdf.
210. Jenkins et al., supra note 93.

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

1210

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

[Vol. 1:1167

for restoring wetlands on farming land in the valley. The study focused on a
variety of potential ecosystem services from wetlands restoration, including
carbon sequestration; reductions in emission of methane and nitrous oxide; water
quality improvements through nitrogen mitigation; promotion of habitat for frogs,
black bears, and migratory birds; and recreational value from waterfowl hunting.
The study found that the societal value of these services far exceeded the
purely agricultural value of the land, but that society currently does not reward
farmers for any of these services in the Mississippi alluvial valley except for
waterfowl hunting that could bring in a small and relatively inconsequential sum
per acre of wetland (thirty-seven dollars).211 However, a combination of carbon
offsets and water quality trades could provide sufficient income to farmers to
support wetlands restoration and protection.212 Of these two sources of income,
the value from water quality trading (approximately $1540 per acre) was over oneand-a-half times the revenue achievable from carbon offsets ($980 per acre).213
Finally, a growing mitigation market under the Clean Water Act provides
funding for farmers and other landowners wishing to enhance or restore wetlands
on their property—which in turn can help improve water quality.214 Under section
404 of the Clean Water Act, no one can drain or fill a wetland without offsetting
the loss with new or improved wetlands elsewhere. The resulting demand for
enhanced or restored wetlands has led to the development of over 600 mitigation
banks in the United States.215 Almost two-thirds of all counties with mitigation
programs contain at least some agricultural lands, although only one farmer to
date appears to have become a mitigation banker.216
2.

Flood Mitigation

Farmers also can reduce downstream flood risks in several ways. First,
farmers can help to even out flood flows through protection and restoration of
wetlands.217 As discussed above, a variety of programs already compensate
farmers for such wetlands.218 Second, farmers can enter into so-called flowage
easements in which they agree to permit their lands to be flooded during periods
of high water flow in order to reduce downstream risks. Federal agencies such as
the Army Corps of Engineers that are responsible for flood management, as well
as state and local governments seeking to protect their residents and property,

211. Id. at 1057 (fifteen dollars per hectare).
212. Id. at 1058–60.
213. Id. at 1057 ($624 per hectare through water quality trading and $396 per hectare through
carbon offsets).
214. See Ruhl & Gregg, supra note 86, at 365–66.
215. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2087.
216. Id.
217. Postel & Thompson, supra note 42, at 98–99; Salzman et al., supra note 7, at 319–22.
218. See, e.g., supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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have paid farmers for such easements in various parts of the nation.219
D. Biodiversity Habitat
Farms also can provide important habitat for imperiled species. Given that
over seventy percent of land in the United States is privately held and that this
land is often the most productive, it is not surprising that private land is also
habitat for almost eighty percent of all species listed under the federal Endangered
Species Act as endangered or threatened.220 Although there has been no
comprehensive study of the nation as a whole, farms would appear to constitute
an important segment of this habitat. In one California study, approximately
twenty percent of species listed under the federal or state Endangered Species
Acts were found in both natural habitats and on agricultural lands; another twenty
percent were found in natural habitats, on farms, and in urban areas.221 In short,
agricultural lands provided partial but important habitat for approximately forty
percent of the species.
Farmers can take various steps to increase the habitat value of their
properties. Farmers, for example, can manage their lands to mimic species’ natural
habitat—e.g., by planting perennials or, in the case of rice farmers, imitating
natural wetlands. Farmers can reduce threats, such as pesticide use, that may
threaten species. Finally, farmers can purposefully manage their lands as part of a
larger landscape—e.g., by creating wildlife corridors across their property that link
other important areas of habitat.222
Several types of programs—including government payments, philanthropic
support, and government-driven markets—currently reward farmers who
promote habitat on their lands for listed or otherwise imperiled species. First,
various programs under the U.S. farm bill reward the creation and enhancement
of habitat. The Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), in particular, provides
cost-sharing funds to farmers who develop and improve wildlife habitat on their
lands.223 Both the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the
Conservation Security Program (CSP) also provide funding to farmers who
219. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FLOWAGE EASEMENT, http://www.swf-wc.
usace.army.mil/cooper/realestate/flowage%20easement.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2010) (describing
the Corps’ practice of acquiring perpetual flowage easements).
220. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON
SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 5–6 (1994).
221. Berry J. Brosi et al., Agricultural and Urban Landscapes, in 2 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY: CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY IN HUMAN-DOMINATED LANDSCAPES 256 (J.
Michael Scott, et al., eds., 2006).
222. See, e.g., SARA VICKERMAN, NATIONAL STEWARDSHIP INCENTIVES: CONSERVATION
STRATEGIES FOR OREGON’S WORKING LANDSCAPE 5–6 (Defenders of Wildlife ed., 1998); William
Pauli, Statement of the American Farm Bureau Federation to the Committee on Environment and
Public Works: Habitat Conservation Planning and the Endangered Species Act (Oct. 19, 1999),
available at http://epw.senate.gov/107th/pau_1019.htm.
223. Cox, supra note 3, at 122.
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enhance the wildlife-habitat value of their land,224 while programs such as the
Wetlands Reserve Program promote habitat by rewarding farmers who restore
natural habitat features on their properties.225
Second, conservation organizations are increasingly recognizing the value of
and rewarding the improvement of habitat on farms and other working
landscapes. The Nature Conservancy, Audubon California, and Point Reyes Bird
Observatory Conservation Science, for example, have joined together with
California rice farmers to promote practices that will increase the value of rice
fields as habitat for wintering waterfowl and shorebirds.226 Rice farming has long
provided habitat for such birds in California, where only ten percent of native
wetlands remain. The joint program to improve the habitat value of rice farms
provides payments to farmers in return for conservation easements and contracts
specifying practices.
Finally, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) can drive markets for habitat
creation, improvement, and protection on agricultural lands.227 The ESA prohibits
any modification of private habitat that might lead to the death or injury of an
endangered species, unless the landowner develops and implements a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) that will provide adequate alternative protection. In
some cases, regional governments will work with landowners and environmental
groups to develop regional HCPs that provide for the protection of some lands in
the region in return for the regulated development of other lands.
HCPs historically focused on the protection of natural habitats,228 but some
recent regional HCPs have encouraged the enhancement of wildlife habitat on
farms. For example, the Natomas Basin HCP in California allows housing
developments in return for payments to a fund to be used to create and support
an 8750-acre reserve.229 Fifty percent of the reserve consists of rice farms, and
another twenty-five percent of upland row crops and fallowed agricultural
lands.230 The HCP pays farms within the reserve both to enhance the wildlife
values of their land and to control predators that could endanger the local listed
species.
The Natomas Basin HCP illustrates an important point regarding the
“production” of wildlife habitat. Habitat improvement on an individual farm or
other parcel of land will seldom be of significant value to imperiled wildlife. Even
efforts by multiple farmers or landowners may fail unless they are coordinated

224. Id. at 142, 144. See also supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
225. See Cox, supra note 3, at 145; supra note 69 and accompanying text.
226. Tom Butler, Our Wild Side, CALIFORNIA RICE BLOG (March 1, 2010), http://www
.calrice.org/Industry+Info/CRC+Blog.htm?id=1267453500.
227. See Thompson, supra note 88 (describing the role of the ESA).
228. Id. at 116.
229. Id. at 116–18.
230. Id. at 116–18.
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across a landscape to provide required scale and needed corridors. Landscape-level
programs such as regional HCPs help overcome this problem by ensuring the
creation of an adequate system of reserves.
E. Lessons Moving Forward
The experiences discussed above suggest a number of important lessons for
promoting EcoFarming in the future. First, government support will remain
critical, whether in the form of direct funding, government-driven markets, or tax
leverage. While renewable energy is a private good, government assistance will be
needed in the short run to overcome current cost disadvantages, provide the
infrastructure needed for a transition away from fossil fuels, and promote research
on new and improved technologies. All of the other ecosystem services of likely
importance to EcoFarming are public goods and depend in large part on
government support.
Second, governmental support would benefit from at least two forms of
integration—integration across programs, and integration across landscapes. As
this section highlights, current support programs are highly fragmented. The
federal farm bill alone supports ten major conservation programs, as well as
another fifteen more minor programs.231 Other federal programs, as well as state
programs, add to a growing mix. Farmers who wish to take advantage of these
governmental incentive payments must apply individually to all relevant support
programs, which typically have divergent requirements and processes. The
resulting transaction costs can deter farmers from participating, undercutting the
movement toward a broader set of agricultural products. The federal government
could help reduce the transaction costs by developing a whole farm program that
allows farmers to apply for multiple federal incentives at the same time and
through one process.232 The federal government also could help reduce
transaction costs by coordinating with states to ensure that similar state and
federal programs work in concert to promote common goals.233
For many ecosystem services, governmental support also should strive to
promote production across an entire landscape rather than on a farm-by-farm
basis.234 As discussed in Section D above, efforts by an individual farmer to
improve habitat are unlikely to be effective unless neighboring farmers make
231. Cox, supra note 3, at 124.
232. See Arha et al., supra note 4, at 221–22 (proposing coordinated delivery of conservation
programs through “Whole Farm Stewardship Agreement[s]”).
233. See Kaush Arha et al., Coordinated State and Federal Ag-Conservation Efforts: The Case of
Missouri and Nebraska, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL, supra note 3, at 189
(discussing the advantages of greater state-federal coordination of farm bill conservation programs).
234. See Arha et al., supra note 4, at 220–21 (emphasizing the importance of a landscape
approach, perhaps along watershed lines); Rebecca L. Goldman et al., Institutional Incentives for Managing
the Landscapes: Inducing Cooperation for the Production of Ecosystem Services, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 333
(2007) (same).
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similar efforts; the same is true of various other ecosystem services including water
quality and flood protection. Many ecosystem services are produced at a landscape
scale and require incentives that coordinate efforts across a landscape.235 Rather
than rewarding individual farmers for particular actions, government incentive
programs therefore should provide incentives for coordinated action by farmers
across a relevant landscape.
Third, scientific and technical uncertainty remains a significant obstacle to
the development of effective markets or incentives for a variety of important
ecosystem services.236 As discussed earlier, carbon offsets require verifiability, yet
we still have insufficient information in order to accurately predict or measure the
impact of various farming practices on greenhouse gas emissions and
sequestration. Similar measurability problems plague water quality trading, wetland
banking, conservation banking, and other environmental markets.237 Beneficiaries
of ecosystem services are unlikely to pay farmers to produce particular services
unless they have a strong sense of the flow and value of the ecosystem services
that will result.238 Better measurement tools and information are also needed to
ensure that direct government support is efficient and properly directed. There is
thus an important need for new scientific research and the development of new
tools that can do a better job of predicting and measuring the effect of particular
farming practices on the flow of ecosystem services.239
The cost to farmers of participating in new ecosystem-service markets and
programs is also frequently uncertain, deterring many farmers from engaging in
the practices.240 For example, if engaging in a water quality trade will require a
farmer to change his operations in a way that might reduce his yield to an
unknown degree, the farmer might not take the risk that the additional revenue
from the trade will be greater than the lost revenue from the reduced yield.
Governments or nonprofits may wish to create new insurance programs to
overcome the risk adversity of many farmers. The American Farmland Trust, a
nonprofit organization focused on protecting farmland and improving farms’
environmental performance, is currently experimenting with a prototype insurance
system that protects farmers who engage in best management practices for
nutrient management or reduced tillage against loss.241
Finally, farmers need organizations that can help facilitate ecosystem-service
markets and incentive programs. As emphasized already, engaging in new markets
and incentive programs can be costly to farmers. To participate, farmers must
235. Goldman et al., supra note 234, at 333, 335.
236. Ribaudo et al., supra note 3, at 2088.
237. Id.
238. Thompson, supra note 16, at 477; Postel & Thompson, supra note 42, at 106–07.
239. Ribaudo et al., supra note 3, at 2088.
240. Id.
241. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, AFT’S BMP CHALLENGE, http://www.farmland.org
/programs/environment/solutions/bmp-challenge.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
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learn of the opportunities, determine exactly what steps are needed to take
advantage of the opportunities (including what technically they must do on their
farms), follow whatever process is required, and then undertake whatever followup actions are required (e.g., reporting requirements or verification oversight).242
Some of the steps outlined above, such as the development of a whole farm
program, can reduce these costs, but they will not eliminate them. Organizations
are therefore needed that can (1) help link farmers with appropriate programs, (2)
assist farmers in meeting the programs’ requirements, and (3) provide needed
technical assistance.243 New organizations may sometimes arise to meet these
needs. The rise of offset aggregators discussed earlier in this section is an example.
Some have also suggested the need for the formation of ecosystem service
districts that could tax the beneficiaries of ecosystem services and use the resulting
funding to work with farmers and other landowners to produce the needed
services.244 In other situations, existing organizations may help assume one or
more of these tasks. For example, the American Farmland Trust is working to
help farmers take advantage of water quality markets.245 Conservation districts,
which have long assisted farmers on soil conservation, might also be well situated
to provide advice and assistance on ecosystem services.246
V. CONCERNS ABOUT ECOFARMING
This Article has focused so far on the potential advantages of EcoFarming.
But EcoFarming also generates concerns, two of which are the focus of this Part.
First, should we pay farmers to produce the ecosystem services discussed above,
or should it be their social responsibility to provide them? We do not pay factories
to reduce their pollution. Why should we pay farmers to do what some people
argue is environmentally “correct”? Second, what is the risk that agriculture will
capture governmental programs to encourage the production of ecosystem
services—maximizing the revenue to farmers, while minimizing the benefits to
society?
A. The Baseline Question
Society expects all individuals, firms, and industries to meet a minimum
environmental standard—what is sometimes called a baseline standard.247 We
242. Ribaudo et al., supra note 6, at 2089–90.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2001); Thompson, supra note 16, at 484.
245. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS, http://www
.farmland.org/programs/environment/water-quality/water-quality-trading/What-is-Water-QualityTrading.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
246. Thompson, supra note 16, at 484.
247. See generally Thompson, supra note 16, at 482 (emphasizing the importance of baselines to
ecosystem-service markets).
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might be willing to provide a financial incentive to encourage someone to go
beyond the baseline, but we generally do not believe that it is appropriate to pay
someone to meet the baseline itself. The baseline is an ethical obligation that no
one should be paid to achieve. For example, few would suggest that the
government should pay factories to stop polluting rivers or should pay hunters not
to kill endangered mammals.
EcoFarming raises the question of the appropriate baseline environmental
standards for farming. For example, if we believe that farmers should manage
their farmland in order to minimize polluting runoff from their operations, paying
farmers to reduce their use of fertilizer and other potential contaminants would be
no more appropriate than paying a factory not to pollute. Society should expect
and require all farmers to meet certain minimum standards, including the
maintenance and production of a minimum set and quantity of ecosystem
services. These minimum baseline standards are non-negotiable and should not
depend on the profitability of the practices required to achieve them. Once
minimum standards are set, society can compensate EcoFarmers for achieving
higher standards and or further increasing the flow and value of ecosystem
services. But it should not compensate EcoFarmers to meet the minimum
standards themselves.
Stating the problem unfortunately does not help determine the appropriate
standard. Baseline standards are frequently contested and can vary over time. One
reason why regulatory takings has been a much debated constitutional issue in
recent years is due to shifting baselines and consequent debates over the
appropriateness of the shift. For example, once permissible water diversions and
land development are now illegal under the Endangered Species Act. Whether the
water or property owners deserve compensation for a regulatory taking is a debate
over where the baseline should be.
Baselines are at one level political questions, to be determined and defined by
legislatures. If Congress does not have the votes to require farmers to engage in
conservation tillage, for example, conventional tillage practices are effectively the
baseline—even if strong normative arguments can be made that the baseline
should be higher. Addressed from a slightly different angle, environmentalists may
prefer that Congress require farmers to meet particular environmental standards.
If the standards are politically impossible, however, incentive systems may be the
second-best option. Time adds complexity. Baselines are sticky; they have inertia.
Environmentalists therefore may decide not to back an incentive program because
they hope that political views will change and that Congress will strengthen the
regulation of farmers in the future. The ultimate question, nonetheless, is still
political.
Baselines are also a normative question: what should farmers be expected to
do? While legislatures ultimately determine the baseline, normative considerations
hopefully guide them, and political debates over baselines generally focus on
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normative considerations. Unfortunately, there are no clear normative rules for
determining appropriate baselines. Instead a complex and messy balancing of
multiple factors generally determines our views of appropriate baselines. Key
factors include:
 Status Quo: Baseline determinations often start with the status
quo, which holds a strong grip on most people’s normative views.248
Proponents of a different baseline generally have the burden of
justifying the shift. Even when baselines other than the status quo
are imposed on future entrants into a business, governments often
maintain the status quo as the baseline for existing participants by
grandfathering them.
 Comparative Baselines: One approach to determining the
appropriate baseline for one segment of society (e.g., farmers) is to
see where government has set the baseline for others. For example,
if industrial factories are not expected to pollute waterways, farmers
presumably should not be permitted to pollute (all other factors
held equal).
 Feasibility: Another factor that may inform our view of the
appropriate baseline is what is financially feasible for an individual
or firm to do without governmental assistance. Although society
might forbid some behaviors no matter how costly to an individual
or firm because of the harm that would otherwise occur, society
may decide that financial feasibility is an appropriate consideration
in setting baselines involving less harmful or troubling behavior.249
 Harm: The degree of societal harm that various actions will cause
also frequently informs out view of appropriate baselines. More
harmful or dangerous activities are more likely to be addressed
through regulation than incentives.
 Action Versus Inaction: Although the normative underpinnings
are unclear, baselines often appear to differentiate between banning
actions that are harmful and requiring actions that are beneficial.
Few people, for example, would argue that farmers should be
required to plant biofuels, while most would argue that they should
not be permitted to unconditionally pollute. The distinction
sometimes can seem ephemeral. In theory, most behaviors can be
described in either way: a ban on nitrogen pollution, for example,
248. For a detailed and interesting discussion of the pull of “historic baselines,” see J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
249. A number of regulatory statutes, such as the Occupational Health & Safety Act (OSHA)
and the Safe Drinking Water Act, use economic feasibility in determining the appropriate regulatory
standard. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 83, at 188–89.
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can be just the flip side of a requirement that farmers use less
fertilizer. In practice, however, the distinction has strong intuitive
pull.
 Natural Conditions: In recent years, natural conditions have also
had a strong pull in determining baselines. If natural conditions are
deemed the appropriate baseline, actions that adversely impact
natural conditions (e.g., destruction of natural wetlands) would be
impermissible, while other actions (e.g., the construction of a wind
farm) can be the potential subject of incentives.
Looking at the various services discussed in Part IV, renewable energy would
seem an appropriate focus for markets and incentives. None of the normative
considerations just outlined would call for requiring farmers to provide renewable
energy as a baseline standard. The various other services, however, are more
contestable. Arguments could be made based on the above considerations both
for and against requiring farmers to provide the services. At the moment,
however, it seems politically unlikely that Congress or state legislatures will require
farmers to provide the services without any type of incentive. As noted at the
outset, EcoFarming therefore may be the only means of obtaining the services.
Over time, more may be required of farmers and less provided through markets
and incentives as environmental norms continue to evolve and baselines therefore
shift, but EcoFarming will always remain important for those services viewed as
beyond the baseline.
B. Capture
A second concern is that farmers will capture any governmental program
developed to promote ecosystem services through EcoFarming and undermine
their social benefits. Agriculture remains a potent political group. Once the
government establishes a program of direct incentives, tax leverage, or
government-driven markets, agriculture will be tempted to find ways to increase
the income from these programs while minimizing the cost of taking advantage of
them. If as a result the cost of government programs increases and the benefits to
society decrease, the programs at some point might become a net burden on
rather than benefit to society.
The concern is not theoretical. The farm lobby, for example, has sought to
maximize federal subsidies for ethanol, while weakening the environmental
standards that the ethanol must meet.250 During debates on the American Clean
Energy and Security Act (ACES) (also known as the Waxman-Markey bill), the
farm lobby similarly sought to minimize the regulatory requirements for
agricultural offsets and to place oversight of the offsets in the Department of
250. Mark Clayton, The Politics of Ethanol Outshine Its Costs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
15, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1115/p02s02-uspo.html.
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Agriculture rather than the Environmental Protection Agency (which would have
had oversight of other forms of offsets).251
The creation of government incentives or other programs to promote public
goods inevitably carries the risk of capture. The major step that can be taken to
reduce the risk of capture is to develop better measures of how particular
agricultural actions will affect the flow of ecosystem services and the value of
those services. Capture feeds on uncertainty. If the benefits of particular actions
are uncertain, industries can use the uncertainty to argue for higher payments. If it
is unclear whether a weakening of standards will actually affect social well-being,
industries can use the uncertainty to argue for relaxed standards. The risk of
capture thus highlights the need, discussed earlier, for new information and tools
to measure and value the flow of ecosystem services from farm activities.
Legislatures can also design programs to try to minimize the dangers of
capture. For example, rather than authorizing variable incentives for the
production of ecosystem services (which could be readily captured), legislatures
can provide for reverse auctions or similar mechanisms designed to force farmers
to compete against each other for available funding. The Department of
Agriculture has long used a form of reverse auction under the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP).252
VI. CONCLUSION
Farmers historically have thought of themselves largely as growers of crops
and livestock. However, farmers are managers of one of our most precious
resources—land. And they can use the land to produce not only crops and
livestock, but also a wide variety of other ecosystem goods and services, including
renewable energy, climate regulation, hydrologic services, and wildlife habitat. By
focusing on only a limited segment of the valuable goods and services that they
can produce, farmers have maximized crops and livestock to the disadvantage of
the other goods and services. The concept of EcoFarming would enlarge the
vision of agriculture and encourage farmers to manage their land for the optimum
mix of goods and services.
EcoFarming is of immense importance. All but a handful of ecosystem
services have declined over the last fifty years and are likely to continue to decline
absent new policies and practices. Because farmers control a majority of the
nation’s and world’s land, farming is key to the future condition of our natural
capital. Although government could attempt to protect natural capital on farms
251. See, e.g., OLMSTEAD, supra note 142 (summarizing the ACE provisions); Christa Marshall,
Agricultural Offsets—a Savoir or a Boondoggle?, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/06/12/12climatewire-agriculture-offsets----a-savior-or-a-boondog-33517.
html.
252. See, e.g., Policy Diversity, supra note 53, at 372 (discussing the advantages of reverse auctions
and their use under CRP).

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

1220

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

[Vol. 1:1167

through regulation, prior efforts to increase environmental regulation of farmers
have often failed. Regulation, moreover, is largely static and typically does not
promote performance beyond the standard that is set. EcoFarming, by contrast,
would encourage farmers to continually find new ways to increase the overall flow
of ecosystem goods and services from their lands.

